BUCK (DO NOT DELETE)

11/1/2018 1:14 PM

A Farewell to Falsity
Shifting Standards in Medicare Fraud Enforcement
Isaac D. Buck†
For the better part of a decade, Americans have had a front-row seat
to a fervent and turbulent debate over the future of their health care system.
The passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(ACA), the most comprehensive health reform effort since the mid-1960s,
ushered in a new era in health law and policy, granting millions of
Americans access to health care. After multiple legal challenges and
congressional efforts that ultimately failed to slay the law, the ACA had
become entrenched by the end of the Obama administration, even though
pieces of the law had failed to work exactly as planned. Now, with the
surprising election of President Donald Trump, reenergized Republicans are
targeting the law once more, and it suddenly appears more vulnerable than
ever. Dynamic uncertainty again permeates the national debate.
Although most powerful protections of the ACA may evaporate—no
small event, to be sure—the value-based era which it unleashed seems here
to stay. Indeed, this era—focused on efficiency, standardization, and quality
within American medicine—has just begun to bear fruit. Illustrated
prominently by recent changes to Medicare that alter how the program pays
its doctors for services they provide to its beneficiaries, America is moving
away from the old strictures of fee-for-service medicine. At the same time,
traditional legal tools, and particularly the federal government’s most
prominent anti-fraud tool, the civil federal False Claims Act (FCA), seem to
be facing new limits. This has been recently evident in medical necessitybased fraud cases, and particularly highly publicized fights that have
targeted the burgeoning industry of hospice care.
This Article tracks this development, ultimately arguing that the move
to “reimbursement-based regulation” may be a positive step in finally
reining in the worst excesses of American health care. But it also cautions
against the deceptive simplicity of allowing medical heterogeneity and
clinical complexity to prevent application of America’s most powerful anti†
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fraud tools to its medical industry. Just because reimbursement policy has
shifted to shoulder some of the regulatory burden of overtreatment does not
mean that health care fraud—like fee-for-service medicine—should be
confined to the past.
In the end—and regardless of whatever legislation the national debate
surrounding American health care produces—American medicine must
adequately address its susceptibility to overtreatment, its incentives toward
financial excess and waste, and its inability to push providers and entities
into adopting more efficient practices. Medicare is finally moving quickly to
bring about effective changes, and the program is seeking clarity in the midst
of a period of tremendous uncertainty for American health care.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nothing seems certain about the future of American health care
administration and delivery in 2018. With the stunning election of President
Donald Trump, and with Republican majorities governing both houses of
Congress, Washington remains poised to cut, refocus, and replace portions
of former President Barack Obama’s signature domestic achievement, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). Subject to
swirling and shifting political winds, the bruised but resilient ACA—
responsible for the health insurance of millions of Americans who lacked it
prior to passage—teeters on the brink.1
But while the public stirs, embroiled in a reopened debate focused on
the future of health reform, other pieces of the health care enterprise continue
their quiet value-based shift that was launched during the Obama
administration. Like a projectile without gravity to slow it, new value-based
mechanisms, pressures, and incentives are increasingly pushing doctors into
more creative and efficient forms of practice. Medicare, after seemingly
succumbing to a dominant fee-for-service paradigm for decades, has
awakened, and the program is pushing providers into thinking more saliently
about—and doing more regarding—quality and cost. In addition to shoring
up Medicare’s finances as it faces increasing financial pressure and swelling
enrollment, a new reimbursement policy imposes a new soft pressure against
providers. Concerns from the evidence-based world of quality and efficiency
are seeping into Medicare’s reimbursement formulas. And as a result,
Medicare may finally be on the path to gaining control over its leaky
finances.
Unmasked by this new value-based era, the old dominant cost-control
regime is showing its wear. The hard law decision-making that has
characterized the extent of federal control over the cost of Medicare is
fraying. The hallmark of this regime—reliant on the federal civil False
1
To be clear, the ACA stretches its tentacles into nearly every corner of health law,
clearly complicating efforts to make it completely disappear. And it has proven to be vital
for millions of Americans. Now voluntary, the Medicaid Expansion under the ACA is
responsible for coverage for individuals living below 138 percent of the poverty line in thirtyfour states. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND.,
http://kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expandingmedicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/?currentTimeframe=0 (last updated Sept. 11, 2018).
Even though down from 2016, the battered health insurance exchanges still saw more than
9.2 million Americans sign up on the federal exchanges. See Robert Pear, Affordable Care
Act Sign-Ups Dip Amid Uncertainty and Trump Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/us/politics/affordable-care-act-obama-care-signup.html. The ACA has reformed the fraud and abuse laws, giving the federal government
increased power to target health care fraud and abuse. It has also reformed and elevated the
quality of insurance plans that Americans receive. All of these reforms are theoretically at
risk.
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Claims Act (FCA),2 a 150-year-old statute high on brute force and low on
nuance—is finally looking its age. And a growing number of federal court
cases, featuring allegations of fraudulent medical necessity, seem willing to
reject the application of the stilted FCA to the heterogeneous and
complicated world of medical practice. Whether the cases are legally
defensible is up for debate, but what is clear is that the enforcement world
seems poised to change. And where the old law answer gives way, the new
soft law of incentives and pressures is taking its place.
This Article summarizes that development. Using a case study of the
burgeoning popularity of Medicare’s hospice benefit—a new target of the
Department of Justice (DOJ)’s FCA enforcement regime—this Article
chronicles this shift, focusing on changes brought by reimbursement policy
and their relation to the future development of the FCA in medical necessitybased fraud cases. And while recent trends do not sound the death knell for
the FCA’s applicability to these cases (for the most prominent, an appeal
remains), recent noteworthy cases have damaged it.
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part II, the modern FCA
enforcement mechanism, focused on new areas of rapid development and
inconsistency, are introduced. In Part III, the federal government’s new
focus on hospice fraud is documented. In Part IV, U.S. v. AseraCare,3
perhaps the strongest case in support of a new era in health care fraud and
abuse enforcement—and one whose appeal remains pending at the time of
this writing—is summarized. Next, in Part V, the challenges that
characterize fraud-based enforcement in this area—particularly focused on
medical necessity-based fraud—are chronicled. Finally, in Part VI,
Medicare’s new value-based reimbursement regime—ushered in by the
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA) of 2015—is
presented. It is MACRA that has revamped and evolved Medicare
reimbursement policy—and has pushed American health care into
embracing new value-based mechanisms.

2

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–3733 (2018).
United States v. AseraCare Inc. (AseraCare I), 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372 (N.D. Ala. 2015),
appeal docketed, No. 16-13004 (11th Cir. May 27, 2016).
3
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II. SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The FCA has been used as a primary tool to prosecute cases of health
care fraud,4 but it also has been used as a potent fraud-fighting tool for any
alleged government-related fraud in the modern era—from housing,5 to
education,6 to environmental matters.7 The FCA has been particularly active
during the last decade; counting from the beginning of the modern era of
FCA enforcement (beginning in 1986),8 sixty percent of the federal
government’s recoveries under the FCA—three of every five dollars
recovered—have been made since January 2009.9 And although the specific
4

Fiscal year 2016 continued a period featuring aggressive action by the DOJ in fighting
health care fraud. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs,
Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services Announce Record-Breaking
Recoveries Resulting from Joint Efforts to Combat Health Care Fraud (Feb. 11, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departments-justice-and-health-and-human-servicesannounce-record-breaking-recoveries (“In the past fiscal year, our relentless pursuit of health
care fraud resulted in the disruption of an array of sophisticated fraud schemes and the
recovery of more taxpayer dollars than ever before. This report demonstrates our serious
commitment to prosecuting health care fraud and safeguarding our world-class health care
programs from abuse.”).
5
The False Claims Act & Federal Housing Administration Lending, U.S. DEP’T. OF
JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/falseclaims-act-federal-housing-administration-lending:
The Justice Department has powerful tools to address this type of
misconduct. One tool, a statute called the False Claims Act, allows the
department to investigate and sue entities that submit false statements and
claims to the government, recover losses caused by those entities and
deter similar misconduct by others. In order to protect America’s
taxpayers and homeowners, the department has used the False Claims Act
in a series of settlements and actions against lenders that knowingly
submitted or caused the submission of false claims for FHA mortgage
insurance by approving FHA insured loans that the lenders knew were
not eligible.
Id.
6
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, For-Profit
College Company to Pay $95.5 Million to Settle Claims of Illegal Recruiting, Consumer
Fraud and Other Violations (Nov. 16, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/profit-collegecompany-pay-955-million-settle-claims-illegal-recruiting-consumer-fraud-and.
7
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Lockheed Martin
Agrees to Pay $5 Million to Settle Alleged Violations of the False Claims Act and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (Feb. 29, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
lockheed-martin-agrees-pay-5-million-settle-alleged-violations-false-claims-act-andresource.
8
See Joe W. Harper & Jaci L. Overmann, Analysis of DOJ’s False Claims Act
Recoveries in FY 2016, Recent Trends and Predictions for Future: $4.7 Billion Year, NAT’L.
L. REV. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/analysis-doj-s-false-claimsact-recoveries-fy-2016-recent-trends-and-predictions (noting the start of “the modern era of
FCA enforcement” as beginning in 1986 “when Congress significantly revised the statute to
incentivize more qui tam cases”).
9
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department
Recovers Over $4.7 Billion From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016),
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direction of the Trump administration’s DOJ is not known at the time of this
writing,10 the federal government continues to lean on the FCA to provide
the balance of fraud recoveries—a posture that decisively began in
conjunction with the inauguration of President Obama.11 Isolating for health
care fraud recoveries reveals a similar pattern: in total, the DOJ has
recovered nearly $20 billion in health care fraud claims since January of
2009, which is “57 percent of the health care fraud dollars recovered in the
thirty years since the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act.”12
Unsurprisingly, 2016 was another banner year for FCA enforcement at
the DOJ. The federal government recovered more than $4.7 billion in cases
featuring FCA allegations in fiscal year 2016, which was the “third highest
annual recovery in False Claims Act history.”13 And $2.5 billion of the $4.7
billion recovered due to the FCA were recoveries from the health care
industry.14 Notably, the $2.5 billion in recoveries signified an uptick from
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act
-cases-fiscal-year-2016 [hereinafter Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion] (noting
that 60 percent of recoveries against federal programs have occurred since 2008). Further,
during the Obama administration, 5,106 qui tam cases were filed (compared to 2,930 during
the previous eight years under President George W. Bush), and the total recovery exceeded
$31 billion (compared to nearly $14 billion recovered during the previous eight years under
President Bush). See Harper & Overmann, supra note 8.
10
Commentators do not seem to agree on what type of DOJ enforcement to expect under
the Trump administration. See Peter J. Henning, How Trump’s Presidency Will Change the
Justice Dept. and S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/11/10/business/dealbook/how-trumps-presidency-will-change-the-justice-dept-andsec.html (written before the confirmation of Jeff Sessions) (“One area that is easy to cut is the
money devoted to white-collar crime” and “[t]here is rarely any great hue and cry about fewer
prosecutors being available to pursue health care fraud or price-fixing, the types of cases that
do not generate big headlines, so moving people out of those areas is unlikely to draw much
notice. Starving white-collar investigations to devote more attention to other priorities has
been seen before.”); Stephen Kuperberg, Do Not Expect Lax Financial Enforcement Under
Trump, LAW360 (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/876528/do-not-expectlax-financial-enforcement-under-trump (“Private whistleblowers under qui tam
provisions . . . figure to profit handsomely by uncovering and reporting financial fraud. So
too do private plaintiffs in matters that could trigger federal investigations in realms such as
banking fraud, antitrust and health care fraud. Actions by these private litigants have grown
significantly over the past few decades and show no sign of abating.”).
11
Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 9; Harper & Overmann,
supra note 8; Bibeka Shrestha, FCA Recoveries Top $3B for 2nd Year in a Row, LAW360
(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.law360.com/articles/294719/fca-recoveries-top-3b-for-2ndyear-in-a-row (“The U.S. Department of Justice said . . . it had raked in more than $3 billion
in civil False Claims Act settlements and judgments – mostly in health care fraud cases –
during fiscal year 2011, marking the second consecutive year the department surpassed the
$3 billion mark.”). Further, FCA recoveries “since January 2009 [through the end of fiscal
year 2011] total[ed] $8.7 billion – the largest three-year total in the department’s history.” Id.
12
Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 9.
13
Id.
14
Id. (“In many of these cases, the Department was instrumental in recovering additional
millions of dollars for state Medicaid programs. This is the seventh consecutive year the
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fiscal year 2015, which saw $1.9 billion in FCA-related health care fraud
recoveries.15 This was aided by two large settlements with pharmaceutical
companies.16 Indeed, nearly fifty percent of the $2.5 billion recovered was
extracted from the drug and medical device industry.17 In all, according to
the DOJ, the FCA is responsible for more than $31 billion in federal
government recoveries since 2009.18
But this era of aggressive FCA enforcement is juxtaposed against an
enforcement environment that features a substantial amount of uncertainty
regarding the application of the law. Much of the confusion within FCA
enforcement centers around its core component of falsity, and has been
especially present in two types of FCA claims. Both of these types of claims
credit the sanctity of scientific and clinical judgment while seemingly
minimizing the force of law, blunting the reach of the powerful regulatory
state within American health care.
The first type of claim features allegations against pharmaceutical
companies—where the conception of falsity under the FCA and another law,
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA),19 are in direct conflict. The
second type of claim arises in so-called medical necessity-based fraud cases,
in which the DOJ alleges that fraud has occurred because the care
administered (and subsequently billed for) was not medically necessary.
This second claim has become an area of focus and interest for relators,
government officials, and health care providers, and is the primary focus of
this Article.20
But first, as Professor Joan Krause has written about recently regarding
pharmaceutical companies, the legal standard of falsity as applied in
different contexts has become inextricably complicated.21 Her observations
suggest an inconsistent treatment of the falsity requirement under disparate,
Department’s civil health care fraud recoveries have exceeded $2 billion.”).
15
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Justice Department
Recovers Over $3.5 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2015 (Dec. 3, 2015),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-35-billion-false-claimsact-cases-fiscal-year-2015.
16
Harper & Overmann, supra note 8 (noting a $785 million settlement by Wyeth and a
$390 million settlement by Novartis Pharmaceuticals). The numbers reflect both federal and
state settlement amounts.
17
Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 9.
18
Id.
19
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301–399 (2018).
20
See Michael W. Youtt et al., False Claims Act Actions—The Developing Case Law
Regarding If and When Opinions of Medical Necessity Can Be Fraudulent, 27 HEALTH LAW.
36, 36 (2015) (“The filing of False Claims Act actions alleging the false or fraudulent
submission of claims for medically unnecessary Medicare or Medicaid items or services is a
growing trend.”).
21
See Joan H. Krause, Truth, Falsity, and Fraud: Off-Label Drug Settlements and the
Future of the Civil False Claims Act, 71 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 401 (2016).
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but related, legal regimes. Developing case law under the FDCA, including
the seminal 2012 Second Circuit decision in U.S. v. Caronia,22 has resulted
in an anomalous—and undoubtedly inconsistent—regulatory scenario.23
Specifically, these trends complicate situations for pharmaceutical
companies whose sales representatives tout truthful, yet unapproved (by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA)), scientific information regarding a
pharmaceutical drug’s effectiveness.24 Under Caronia, sales representatives
who relay truthful but unapproved drug information cannot be said to have
violated the FDCA because the statements made—while violative of the
FDA’s marketing laws, as they disseminate information that has not been
vetted or approved by the FDA—are scientifically true.25 That is, some
courts26 are finding that truthful, but off-label, unapproved scientific
marketing is not violative of the FDCA. In effect, courts are carving out an
area of truthful marketing from the reach of the FDCA, which may have a
number of detrimental effects.27
The challenge of choosing to enforce off-label marketing in this way,
however, means that the legal standard—that is, whether or not the
pharmaceutical sales marketing staff can advertise and market a drug in a
certain way—hinges on whether the statement is scientifically true, and not
on whether the statement has been approved by the FDA.28 This new
application could have a number of deleterious effects, not the least of which
is the challenge surrounding how exactly one knows whether the statement
is scientifically true. But, beyond this challenge, this trend has confused
application of the fraud laws to these scenarios. Indeed, as Professor Krause
notes, this new theory of liability regarding falsity has not yet migrated out
of FDCA enforcement and into FCA enforcement, and, consequently, a
glaring inconsistency currently exists.29 Notwithstanding the FDCA’s
22
United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2012) (vacating Caronia’s conviction
under the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
23
Krause, supra note 21, at 403 (“Yet logic suggests that if manufacturers have a First
Amendment right to discuss truthful off-label uses of their products, bills submitted to
Medicare or Medicaid when the drugs are used for those indications should not be considered
false.”) (emphasis in original).
24
Id. at 403.
25
Id. at 418.
26
See Jones v. Medtronic, 89 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1047 (D. Ariz. 2015), aff’d & vacated
in part, No. 15-15653, 2018 WL 3912167 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Courts differ as to whether ‘offlabel’ promotion and use violates FDA requirements. Some courts hold that federal law does
not bar off-label promotion, while other courts hold that the FDCA’s misbranding provisions
ban off-label promotion.”).
27
Id.; see also Christopher T. Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment
Right to Promote Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 1019 (2017); Patricia J. Zettler, The
Indirect Consequences of Expanded Off-Label Promotion, 78 OHIO ST. L. J. 1053 (2017).
28
Krause, supra note 21, at 418.
29
Id. at 403.
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application to truthful, but off-label marketing, under FCA enforcement,
whether or not the marketing is scientifically true is immaterial; when offlabel marketing leads to a prescription and a reimbursement, the FCA is
violated.30 Based on current FCA precedent, off-label marketing of a drug
transforms its claim for reimbursement into a false claim for purposes of
FCA liability.
As a result, a pharmaceutical company’s sales and marketing
personnel—if engaged in truthful, but off-label, marketing—may not be
prosecuted under the FDCA because the statements made were not
scientifically false, but they continue to face liability under the FCA.31
Strangely, there has been an inadequate effort made to address this
inconsistency, and a quiet equipoise has been reached.
The second type of shift—on which the balance of this paper, as well
as previous scholarship,32 focuses—features the enduring problem of
medical necessity-based fraud. New court-made doctrine has limited the
DOJ’s ability to reach these types of cases with the FCA. Besides uprooting
settled notions of falsity, this new doctrine is likely to change the settlement
calculus for defendants targeted in a medical necessity-based FCA case.33
Specifically, in these cases—and in one particularly prominent case—courts
have begun to push back on the notion that the DOJ can maintain FCA
liability for care that is allegedly lacking in medical necessity. In addition to
signaling a change for all providers, this shift has particular implications for
doctors who rely on Medicare’s hospice benefit, which is explored deeply
below.
III. A NEW FRONT: HOSPICE FRAUD
Recent cases featuring FCA enforcement have illustrated an increased
focus on hospice care as posing a potentially potent threat of fraud within the
American health care marketplace.34 Hospice care, defined as care that
30
Id. at 419 (noting that “off label promotion leads to a violation of the FCA on the
somewhat circular theory that claims for non-covered drugs are false because the drugs are
not being used for medically accepted (i.e., covered) purposes”).
31
Id.
32
See Isaac D. Buck, Breaking the Fever: A New Construct for Regulating
Overtreatment, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261 (2015) (proposing a reconceptualization of the
harm of medical necessity-based overtreatment, from care that is lacking in medical necessity
to care that is excessively administered).
33
Indeed, because of the potency of the FCA, many medical necessity-based fraud cases
have heretofore ended in settlement, and the interest in these cases has remained academic.
34
See, e.g., Robert W. Markette & Anne. M. Ruff, Hospice Providers Under Increased
Governmental Scrutiny, 16 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 45, 45–46 (2014) (“This growth is
leading to increased scrutiny of the hospice industry.”); Kris. B. Mamula, Hospice Fraud
Becoming a Costly Problem for Medicare, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 6, 2016),
http://www.post-gazette.com/business/healthcare-business/2016/03/06/Hospice-fraud-
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focuses on palliation, or pain relief, as opposed to curative treatment, often
is administered outside of the hospital and applies a “team-oriented approach
to expert medical care, pain management, and emotional and spiritual
support expressly tailored to the patient’s needs and wishes.”35 A quickly
growing piece of the Medicare budget,36 the hospice benefit has enjoyed
increasing usage and societal acceptance in recent years. An analysis of (1)
the hospice benefit’s growing prominence within American health care and
Medicare, and (2) hospice’s increasing attractiveness to FCA enforcement,
follows immediately below.
A. An Explosion of Hospice Care
To understand why federal regulators and prosecutors have
increasingly focused on hospice, one need look no further than the number
of Americans utilizing the services and the amount of money Medicare
spends on it. In short, the number of Americans utilizing hospice services
has risen sharply over the last couple of decades.37 Specifically, according
to National Hospice and Palliative Care Organization (NHPCO) estimates,
the number of Americans who have sought and received hospice services has
risen from 1.38 million in 2010, to 1.46 million in 2011, to 1.5 million in
2012 and 2013, to 1.67 million in 2014.38
estimates-at-65-billion/stories/201603060044 (“No one knows how big the problem of
hospice fraud is . . . but federal investigators prosecuted more than 60 cases in the last year
alone, involving hundreds of millions of dollars nationwide.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. Miss., Cleveland Mississippi Hospice Owner
Sentenced for Healthcare Fraud and Ordered to Pay Over 5 Million Dollars in Restitution
(Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdms/pr/cleveland-mississippi-hospice-owner
-sentenced-healthcare-fraud-and-ordered-pay-over-5 [hereinafter Cleveland Mississippi
Hospice Owner Sentenced] (documenting criminal charges and restitution as a result of an
elaborate health care fraud scheme).
35
See Kathleen Tschantz Unroe & Diane E. Meier, Palliative Care and Hospice:
Opportunities to Improve Care for the Sickest Patients, 25 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 413, 415 (2011) (“The hospice [Medicare] benefit was designed for clearly dying
patients to provide team-based palliative care, usually at home. Hospice is appropriate when
curative treatments are no longer beneficial, when the burdens of treatments outweigh
benefits, or when patients enter the last weeks to months of life.”); see also Hospice Care,
NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., http://www.nhpco.org/about/hospice-care (last
updated Apr. 3, 2017).
36
See Sam Halabi, Selling Hospice, 42 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 442, 442 (2014) (“Now,
hospice is one of the fastest growing costs of Medicare, which began covering hospice in
1983.”).
37
See NHPCO’s Facts and Figures: Hospice Care in America, 2015 Edition, NAT’L
HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., https://www.nhpco.org/sites/default/files/public/2015_
Facts_Figures.pdf [hereinafter NHPCO’s Facts and Figures] (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
38
Id. at 4. Reportedly, 1.2 million Americans die each year in hospice care, which is
nearly half of the 2.6 million deaths that occur annually in America. See Eric Adler, A Good
Death: As End of Life Nears, An Unexpected Friendship Forms in KC Hospice, KAN. CITY
STAR (Apr. 23, 2016), http://www.kansascity.com/news/local/article73547107.html.
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In addition to the raw number of hospice utilizers, this growth also
represents an increase in the proportion of Medicare decedents relying on
hospice services at the end of life.39 In 2001, less than nineteen percent of
Medicare decedents had spent time receiving hospice care.40 By 2007, that
number had jumped to thirty percent,41 and by 2014, the number approached
fifty percent.42 For those Medicare decedents battling cancer, the number
grew from thirty-seven percent in 2001 to forty-three percent in 2007.43
Accompanying the growth in the number of patients seeking hospice
care, the amount of hospice agencies has concurrently boomed.44 The overall
number of hospices in the United States has steadily increased, with 5,150 in
2010 to 6,100 in 2014.45 Of these, more than 4,000 are Medicare-certified
hospice providers, up from just 1,000 in 1992, to 2,000 in 1996, and 3,000
in 2007.46 A majority of these 4,000 hospices are for-profit hospice
agencies.47 Indeed, as of 2014, about sixty percent of hospice-providing
agencies had for-profit ownership.48
Spending on hospice care has soared: Medicare spending on the service
quadrupled between 2000 and 2008.49 In both 2013 and 2014, Medicare
39

NHPCO’s Facts and Figures, supra note 37, at 4.
Id.
41
Id. Interestingly, the typical length of hospice service varies quite drastically. More
than thirty-five percent of those who access hospice services either die or are discharged
within seven days of admission. Id. at 5. About eighteen percent of those who access hospice
services spend between thirty and eighty-nine days receiving services. Id. And just more
than ten percent of those accessing hospice receive services for more than 180 days. Id.
Indeed, the fact that the average hospice stay is so short gives rise to the argument that hospice
services are underutilized. See Leah Eskenazi, Why Hospice Care Could Benefit Your Loved
One Sooner than You Think, PBS NEWSHOUR (Jan. 29, 2015, 6:10 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/hospice-care-might-benefit-loved-one-sooner-think/
(“People often wait too long before seeking hospice care. . . . It seems that misinformation
about the benefit coupled with our general discomfort talking about end of life prevents
Medicare beneficiaries and their families from taking advantage of the valuable benefit.”).
42
Ten FAQs: Medicare’s Role in End-of-Life Care, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 26,
2016),
http://kff.org/medicare/fact-sheet/10-faqs-medicares-role-in-end-of-life-care/
[hereinafter Ten FAQs].
43
NHPCO’s Facts and Figures, supra note 37, at 4.
44
Id. at 8.
45
Id. at 8 (the first hospice program opened in 1974).
46
Id. at 9.
47
Id. at 9 (“The number of for-profit Medicare-certified hospice providers has been
steadily increasing over the past several years . . . . In contrast, the number of Medicarecertified not-for-profit or government providers has declined over the same period.”).
48
National Center for Health Statistics: Hospice Care, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/hospice-care.htm (last updated July 6, 2016).
See also Halabi, supra note 36, at 443 (noting that “the economic and commercial structure
of hospice provision has also radically changed”).
49
See Markette & Ruff, supra note 34, at 45–46:
In its report on hospice, MedPAC noted that from 2000 to 2008, Medicare
40
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spent more than $15 billion on hospice care,50 which overshadowed the $2.9
million Medicare spent on hospice in 2000.51 For those in the final year of
life, “[h]ospice care accounts for about 10 percent of traditional Medicare
spending.”52
As a sign of hospice services’ growth and their increasing prominence
in the American health care system, The Washington Post published a
groundbreaking series in late 2013 and 2014 on the increasing profitability
of the hospice industry in the United States.53 The series highlighted how,
within recent years, profits have ballooned within the industry.54 It also
raised the profile of the hospice industry, highlighting the new era of hospice
fraud enforcement. How, exactly, the hospice benefit became a major target
for anti-fraud efforts and FCA enforcement is explored immediately below.

hospice spending had quadrupled. MedPAC went on to raise concerns
about the growth in hospice utilization, and the report specifically noted
that one of the drivers of this growth was the increased election
of hospice services by non-cancer patients, which accounted for 69
percent of all hospice patients in 2008.
Id.

50
See The Medicare Hospice Benefit, NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., at 3
(Oct. 2015), http://www.nhpco.org/sites/default/files/public/communications/Outreach/The_
Medicare_Hospice_Benefit.pdf (noting that Medicare expenditures on hospice “remained
flat” between 2012 and 2013); Fact Sheet: Medicare Hospice Transparency Data (CY2014),
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.: NEWSROOM (Oct. 6, 2016),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/
fact-sheets/medicare-hospice-transparency-data-cy2014.
51
See Mamula, supra note 34.
52
Ten FAQs, supra note 42.
53
See Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, Hospice Firms Draining Billions from Medicare,
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/medicarerules-create-a-booming-business-in-hospice-care-for-people-who-arentdying/2013/12/26/4ff75bbe-68c9-11e3-ae5622de072140a2_story.html?utm_term=.7dee235da9f9.
54
See Peter Whoriskey, Dan Keating, & Tobey, Healthy Growth in Hospice Profits,
WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2013), http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/business/healthygrowth-in-hospice-profits/689/ (using data gathered from hospice in California, a Washington
Post review found that (1) net operating profit per patient in the hospice sector rose from $353
in 2002 to $1975 in 2012, (2) net operating profit overall rose from $25 million in 2002 to
$265 million in 2012, (3) the average length of hospice care stretched from 44 days in 2002
to 66 days in 2012 (including non-cancer cases growing from 41 days in 2002 to 76 days in
2012), (4) the amount of facilities offering hospice has boomed from 173 facilities in 2002 to
431 facilities in 2012, and (5) the number of patients in hospice has nearly doubled—from
71,535 in 2002 to 134,126 in 2012).
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B. Why Hospice Attracts the FCA
The booming business of Medicare’s hospice benefit has raised
questions about the costly incentives that exist within it.55 Indeed, put
bluntly, “concerns are rising about treatments for patients who aren’t near
death.”56 This rapid growth of the industry, vague clinical standards around
necessity, and dark incentives flowing from reimbursement policy, have
placed the hospice benefit squarely within the sights of the DOJ.57
In order to be a reimbursable service within the Medicare program,
hospice services—and the patients for which they are intended58—must
comply with and meet particular regulatory requirements.59 Specifically, a
physician or medical director must “specify that the individual’s prognosis
is for a life expectancy of six months or less if the terminal illness runs its
course,” the provider must supply clinical information that demonstrates this
judgment, the “physician must include a brief narrative explaining the
clinical findings that supports a life expectancy of [six] months or less as part
of the certification and recertification forms,” and the physician must sign
and date the certification.60 This certification serves as the center of the
conflict around cases of alleged hospice fraud—including the complexity,
heterogeneity, and uncertainty that comes with it.61
55

See Markette & Ruff, supra note 34, at 45–46 (“MedPAC also noted that the hospice
reimbursement system, which reimbursed the hospice a flat amount for each day of hospice
service, created an incentive to try to admit patients who would remain on hospice for longer
periods of time.”).
56
Peter Whoriskey, As More Hospices Enroll Patients Who Aren’t Dying, Questions
About Lethal Doses Arise, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/storyline/wp/2014/08/21/as-more-hospices-enroll-patients-who-arent-dying-questionsabout-lethal-doses-arise/?utm_term=.cefcfac5ac4a (“As the hospice industry has grown,
hospices are more frequently enrolling patients who aren’t near death.”).
57
See Halabi, supra note 36, at 450–51 (detailing FCA allegations against Vitas
Innovative Hospice Care); see also Markette & Ruff, supra note 34, at 71 (“The increased
suspicion of the hospice industry has also led to an increase in the number of hospices being
sued under the federal False Claims Act. . . . Following the lead of the OIG and MedPAC,
these lawsuits have focused on issues related to patient eligibility and include allegations that
hospices have admitted ineligible patients, kept patients on hospice services for which they
were ineligible, and provided medically unnecessary services.”); Mark H. Schlein, NonPharmaceutical False Claim Cases, ANNUAL AAJ-PAPERS 118 (2012) (noting that hospice
fraud is “high on the HHS OIG list” and is “widespread.”).
58
See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 418.3 (2014) (mandating that “[t]erminally ill means that the
individual has a medical prognosis that his or her life expectancy is six months or less if the
illness runs its normal course”).
59
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(dd) (2018) (laying out the hospice program, requirements,
certification, and definitions); see also 42 C.F.R. § 418.22 (2011) (laying out requirements to
meet the certification of terminal illness).
60
42 C.F.R. §§ 418.22(b)(1)–(3), (5) (2011).
61
See Bernice Yeung, AseraCare Hospice, San Francisco-Owned Company, Accused of
Medicare Fraud, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01
/06/aseracare-hospice-medicare-fraud_n_1190658.html (quoting a relator’s attorney calling
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With an increasing emphasis on the hospice benefit, and a growing
number of citizens reaching retirement age, both the Office of Inspector
General (OIG) within the Department of Health and Human Services, and
the DOJ, have turned attention to the problem of hospice fraud.62 The DOJ’s
focus is illustrated by a flurry of recent settlements.63 In one such settlement,
the DOJ alleged that the hospice agency’s “business practices were designed
to maximize the number of patients for whom it could bill Medicare without
regard to whether the patients were eligible for and needed hospice.”64
Further, the allegations focused on actions undertaken by the defendants that
“allegedly included discouraging doctors from recommending that ineligible
patients be discharged from hospice[,] and failing to ensure that nurses
accurately and completely documented patients’ conditions in the medical
records.”65 In another recent settlement, the OIG Special Agent in Charge
lamented that “[p]atients are being falsely diagnosed as terminally ill in order
the terminal illness certification “as much a metaphysical question as a medical question” and
noting that “[t]here’s a lot of wiggle room, and where there’s wiggle room, you have people
who will take advantage of it for their financial gain”).
62
See, e.g., Suzanne Murrin, Hospices Should Improve Their Election Statements and
Certifications of Terminal Illness, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN. (Sept. 2016), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-10-00492.pdf.
63
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Minnesota-Based
Hospice Provider to Pay $18 Million for Alleged False Claims to Medicare for Patients Who
Were Not Terminally Ill (Jul. 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/minnesota-basedhospice-provider-pay-18-million-alleged-false-claims-medicare-patients-who [hereinafter
Minnesota-Based Hospice Provider to Pay $18 Million] (noting that the settlement resolved
allegations under the FCA that Evercare Hospice and Palliative Care “claimed Medicare
reimbursement for hospice care for patients who were not eligible for such care because they
were not terminally ill”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist.
Iowa, Hospice to Pay More Than $1 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Dec.
18, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndia/pr/iowa-hospice-pay-more-1-million-resolvefalse-claims-act-allegations (noting a settlement of nearly $1.1 million to settle allegations
that “Iowa [h]ospice knowingly submitted false claims to the government for payment of
[hospice] services because, during some or all of the period that certain patients were
receiving hospice care, the patients did not have a medical prognosis of six months or less if
their illnesses ran their normal course”); Jennifer Williams & Rose Betts, Guardian Hospice
Pays $3 Million to Resolve Medicare Fraud Allegations, ATLANTA BUS. CHRON. (Oct. 2,
2015),
http://www.bizjournals.com/atlanta/news/2015/10/02/guardian-hospice-pays-3million-to-resolve.html (noting that the settlement ended claims that defendants sought
reimbursement for hospice services for patients who were not terminally ill, and that they
failed to “properly train . . . staff and medical directors on the hospice eligibility criteria, set[]
aggressive targets to recruit and enroll patients, and fail[ed] to properly oversee the Atlanta
hospice”); Hospice to Pay Millions in Settlement for Medicare Fraud, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 12,
2015),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/12/hospice-to-pay-millions-insettlement-for-medicare/ (noting that Good Shepherd Hospice Inc. entered into a settlement
following allegations from the federal government that Good Shepherd “pressured employees
to meet census and hospice admissions targets” and that “employees were paid bonuses based
on the number of patients enrolled”).
64
Minnesota-Based Hospice Provider to Pay $18 Million, supra note 63.
65
Id.
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to line the pockets of hospice owners who are treating Medicare like their
own personal ATM.”66
These allegations are not unique, and they led the OIG to file a report
in the fall of 2016 entitled, “Hospices Should Improve Their Election
Statements and Certifications of Terminal Illness.”67 There remains little
room for misunderstanding; in the report, the OIG found that “[p]revious
OIG work has raised concerns that some election statements used by
hospices are misleading[,] and that physicians are sometimes not involved in
care planning and may rarely visit beneficiaries.”68 The report contained
examples of hospice services fraudulently submitting false claims regarding
hospice eligibility.69 Importantly for the instant purposes, the report noted
that fourteen percent of GIP (“general inpatient”) stays were accompanied
by a deficient certification in violation of federal rules.70 And “in [ten]
percent of stays, the certifying physician did not include a narrative at all or
included only the beneficiary’s diagnosis.”71 As a result, the OIG asserted
“that the certifying physician did not explain the clinical findings that
support a life expectancy for the beneficiary of [six] months or less.”72
These developments have also led the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS) to alert providers to the potential waste and abuse
that could exist within the hospice program related to terminal illness
certification. Policy papers encourage hospice providers to “train[] staff on
hospice eligibility, medical necessity, and proper documentation to avoid
any undue penalties or sanctions[,]”73 and push them to “make sure staff
members understand anti-fraud efforts,” and to “provide proper training
regarding the False Claims Act.”74
The concern is based upon undeniable trends. According to a 2014
report published in the Journal of Palliative Medicine in which the authors
reviewed more than one million Medicare records, they found that “[m]ore
66

Cleveland Mississippi Hospice Owner Sentenced, supra note 34, at 8.
Murrin, supra note 62, at 12.
68
Id.
69
Id. (noting in one case that “the hospice owner also paid health care professionals for
referring patients to his hospice even though they were not appropriate for hospice care”).
70
Id. at 11.
71
Id. at 11.
72
Id. at 11.
73
Program Integrity—An Overview for Hospice Providers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare-Medicaid-Coordination/
Fraud-Prevention/Medicaid-Integrity-Education/Downloads/hospice-provideroverviewfactsheet.pdf [hereinafter Program Integrity—An Overview for Hospice Providers].
74
Hospice Toolkit: Program Integrity—An Overview for Medicaid Hospice Providers,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 2016), https://www.cms.gov/MedicareMedicaid-Coordination/Fraud-Prevention/Medicaid-Integrity-Education/Downloads/
hospice-provideroverview-booklet.pdf.
67
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than one-third of patients who were released alive from hospices did not reenroll in a hospice and were still alive six months after being released.”75
This tracks an undeniable increase in the length of time that individuals are
using the hospice benefit—as “[t]he average length of a stay [in hospice]
rose to 86 days in 2011 from 54 days in 2000.”76 By 2014, that number was
88 days.77 There has been a marked split between for-profit and nonprofit
hospice entities regarding the average length of stay in hospice: in 2013, the
average stay for for-profit hospice was 105 days, while the average stay for
nonprofits was 68 days.78
Finally, even though they tend to vary wildly, states’ “live discharge”
rates, that is, the percentage of individuals who are discharged from the
hospice program alive, are rising overall.79 According to a recent report, the
live discharge percentage ranged from forty-one percent in Mississippi, to
thirty-five percent in Alabama, to seventeen percent and sixteen percent in
Arkansas and Tennessee, respectively.80 Live discharge rates exceeded
twenty-five percent in five states—in addition to Mississippi and Alabama,
the rates were highest among Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Utah.81 This
means that in these five states, more than one in every four patients certified
for Medicare’s hospice benefit ends up being discharged from the program
alive, raising questions about the certification process.
All of this data pressures the enforcement agencies tasked with
overseeing Medicare expenditures.
Although these trends do not
conclusively prove that some providers are taking advantage of Medicare’s
hospice benefit, they also seem to suggest an undeniable shift in hospice care
provision—from shorter to longer stays.82 Whether or not these shifts are
indicative of health care fraud hinge on whether or not the hospice care has

75

See Joan M. Teno et al., A National Study of Live Discharges from Hospice, 17 J.
PALLIATIVE MED. 1081 (2014), http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/jpm.2013.0595?
journalCode=jpm; Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, Rising Rates of Hospice Discharge in
U.S. Raise Questions About Quality of Care, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/leaving-hospice-care-alive-rising-ratesof-live-discharge-in-the-us-raise-questions-about-quality-of-care/2014/08/06/13a4e7a0-175e
-11e4-9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.3662fb5e6967.
76
Mamula, supra note 34.
77
See Hospice Services, in REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 300
(Mar.
2016),
http://www.medpac.gov/docs/default-source/reports/chapter-11-hospiceservices-march-2016-report-.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2017).
78
See Mamula, supra note 34.
79
See Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 75 (noting that, between 2000 and 2012, “the
overall rate of live discharges increased from 13.2 percent of hospice discharges to 18.1
percent in 2012”).
80
Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 75.
81
Id.
82
See Mamula, supra note 34.
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been certified as medically necessary by a physician83—which is where the
center of the battle against hospice fraud currently resides.
IV. UNITED STATES V. ASERACARE
Attempting to use the FCA as a powerful tool against perceived greed
and ballooning profits from health care companies is nothing new, but the
progression and resolution of United States v. AseraCare84—featuring a
prominent hospice provider, multiple attention-grabbing court decisions, and
important new standards for medical-necessity based FCA cases—is
unmatched. Because of the complex medical necessity-based conflict that
can exist within the hospice reimbursement structure, the amount of
allegations from multiple relators featuring medical necessity-based
allegations, and the result of the AseraCare case in early 2016, hospice fraud
enforcement is garnering increasing interest and attention.85 No matter the
ultimate resolution of the AseraCare case—an appeal is pending before the
Eleventh Circuit at the time of this writing86—it provides a worthwhile lens
through which to examine the legal issues at stake. The story of this seminal
case—from the allegations through the trials—follows immediately below.
A. About AseraCare
AseraCare Hospice (“AseraCare”) is, undeniably, a large for-profit
hospice chain.87 It owns facilities in nineteen states,88 and admits 10,000
patients annually.89 AseraCare is described as a hospice and palliative care
company,90 but also offers multifaceted services for those facing the end of
life—including nursing care, bereavement counseling, spiritual support, pet
83

See Buck, supra note 32; Program Integrity—An Overview for Hospice Providers,
supra note 73.
84
U.S. ex rel. Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245 (N.D. Ala. May 2, 2008).
85
See Ina Jaffe, HHS Inspector General’s Report Finds Flaws and Fraud in U.S.
Hospice Care, NPR: POLICY-ISH (Jul. 31, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2018/07/31/634075540/hhs-inspector-generals-report-finds-flaws-and-fraud-in-u-shospice-care.
86
See Lois Norder, Pending Court Ruling Could Be Pivotal in Health Care Fraud Case,
ATLANTA J. CONST. (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.myajc.com/news/crime—law/pendingcourt-ruling-could-pivotal-health-care-fraud-cases/g2MehFpQxMYRIiqv3lan1I/.
87
See Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 53.
88
See Lisa Schencker, Hospice Provider AseraCare Scores a Win in Unusual False
Claims Case, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article
/20160331/NEWS/160339976.
89
See id. (“AseraCare facilities see about 10,000 patient admissions each year, according
to court documents. Most patients are enrolled in Medicare.”).
90
See Melinda Crosby, The Ugly Face of Profiteering in Hospice Care—For-Profit
Effects on the Field, NONPROFIT Q. (Sept. 20, 2016), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2016/09/
20/ugly-face-profiteering-hospice-care-profit-effects-field/ (noting the prevalence of hospice
fraud in the health care system).

FOMATTED - BUCK - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

18

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/1/2018 1:14 PM

[Vol. 49:1

and music therapy, nutrition counseling, social worker counseling, personal
care assistance, and rehabilitation therapy.91 Its services are available in
three different settings—at home, in nursing facilities, and at assisted living
facilities.92
AseraCare is owned by Golden Living, LLC (“Golden Living”), one of
the largest private companies in the United States.93 Founded in 1963 and
based in Plano, Texas, Golden Living, which also owns other health care
companies including Aegis Therapies and 360 Healthcare Staffing, had
grown to employ 42,000 workers by 2016.94 Its total revenue in 2015 topped
$3 billion.95 It is self-described as “one of the nation’s premier providers of
health care services for the aging.”96
Nevertheless, AseraCare would become the target of fraud allegations
made both by private relators and the federal government claiming that the
company engaged in hospice fraud to illegitimately boost its profits.97 The
three private relators’ lawsuits, based on violations of the federal FCA, were
originally filed in 2008, 2009, and 2010.98 All three lawsuits, which were
filed in Alabama, Wisconsin, and Georgia, alleged similar fraudulent
conduct by AseraCare.99
B. Procedural History
The AseraCare action has a unique procedural history. The DOJ
initially intervened in the lawsuit filed in the Northern District of Alabama—
by relators and former employees Dawn Richardson and Marsha Brown.100
91

See ASERACARE HOSPICE, http://www.aseracare.com/services/ (last visited Jan. 23,

2017).
92

Id.
See America’s Largest Private Companies 2017: #150 Golden Living, FORBES,
http://www.forbes.com/companies/golden-living/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2018).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Press Release, AseraCare Hospice, AseraCare Hospice Responds to U.S. Attorney /
Department of Justice Filing (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/assets/pdf/CH
7701013.PDF [hereinafter AseraCare Hospice Responds to U.S. Attorney].
97
See Norder, supra note 86.
98
One lawsuit was filed in May of 2008 by relators Debora Paradies, London Lewis, and
Roberta Manley in the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Motion to Procedurally Consolidate at
2, Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Jul. 13, 2012) [hereinafter Motion to Procedurally Consolidate]. A
second lawsuit was filed on March 27, 2009, by relators Dawn Richardson and Marsha Brown
in the Northern District of Alabama, and a third was filed by relator Joseph L. Micca, in the
Northern District of Georgia. Id.
99
Id.
100
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Files Complaint
Against National Chain of Hospice Providers Alleging False Claims on the Medicare Program
(Jan. 3, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-files-complaint-against-national-chain93
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Specifically, the U.S. government intervened, and that complaint was
unsealed on December 22, 2011.101 On January 3, 2012, through a public
press release, the DOJ announced its reasons for intervening in the FCA
whistleblower lawsuit against AseraCare.102
In addition to the lawsuit filed by Richardson and Brown in Alabama,
the other two lawsuits—filed in Georgia and Wisconsin—raised similar
allegations, so the parties sought to consolidate all three cases in the Northern
District of Alabama.103 On January 23, 2012, District Court Judge J.P.
Stadtmueller granted transfer of the action pending before the Eastern
District of Wisconsin to the Northern District of Alabama due to
“convenience and the interests of justice.”104 And after requesting a transfer
on December 13, 2011,105 the Northern District of Georgia granted a transfer
of Counts III and VI of relator Joseph L. Micca’s complaint (these featured
the hospice fraud allegations) to the Northern District of Alabama.106 This
latter transfer was made on June 22, 2012.107
Once the lawsuits were transferred and consolidated, the DOJ filed a

hospice-providers-alleging-false-claims-medicare [hereinafter U.S. Files Complaint Against
National Chain of Hospice Providers].
101
See Joe Carlson, Feds File Suit Against Hospice Provider AseraCare, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20120103/NEWS/30
1039961. The DOJ had initially intervened in the case brought by Brown and Richardson,
and a consolidated complaint in intervention in 2012 was filed after other actions were
combined with it. Id.
102
U.S. Files Complaint Against National Chain of Hospice Providers, supra note 100.
103
See Motion to Procedurally Consolidate, supra note 98.
104
United States v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 08-cv-384-JPS, 2012 WL 187519, at *2 (E.D.
Wisc. Jan. 23, 2012) (“Underlying this dispute is the existence of two similar False Claims
Act [] actions, one in the Northern District of Georgia, and one in the Northern District of
Alabama, both of which have been unsealed at this juncture . . . . The Georgia and Alabama
actions were also brought against AseraCare, by different relators, for at least similar
Medicare fraud claims. The United States has intervened in the Alabama action and filed its
complaint against AseraCare.”). In granting transfer, the Court noted the “duplicative
discovery and overlapping issues” as well as a “relatively similar set of core facts.” Id. at
*12.
105
See Sweet Home is Alabama for FCA Case, Judge Says: United States v. AseraCare,
17 WESTLAW J. HEALTH CARE FRAUD 9, at *1 (2012).
106
Motion to Procedurally Consolidate at 3, U.S. ex rel. Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., No.
2:12-cv-00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Jul. 13, 2012). Interestingly, on the claims not severed and
transferred, Golden Living Nursing Homes settled the claims with Dr. Micca on January 2,
2013. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice U.S. Attorney’s Office, N. Dist. Ala., Golden
Living Nursing Homes Settle Allegations of Substandard Wound Care (Jan. 2, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndga/pr/golden-living-nursing-homes-settle-allegationssubstandard-wound-care (claims focused on “inadequate and worthless wound care services
to residents at two of its Atlanta area nursing homes”). The settlement amounted to $613,300.
Id.
107
See U.S. ex rel. Micca v. GGNSC Holdings, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-1055-ODE, 2012 WL
13028161 (Jun. 22, 2012).
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consolidated complaint in intervention on August 2, 2012,108 and again on
November 2, 2012.109 All three actions were transferred to the District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama on August 28, 2012,110 before Chief
Judge Karon Owen Bowdre,111 and they were formally and finally
consolidated on October 17, 2012.112
According to a DOJ press release in early 2012 announcing its decision
to intervene, “the government allege[d] that AseraCare violated the False
Claims Act when it misspent millions of taxpayer dollars intended for
Medicare recipients who have a prognosis of six months or less to live and
need hospice care.”113 Further, “the government contend[ed] that AseraCare
Hospice knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare for hospice care for
patients who were not terminally ill.”114 Quoted in the press release, Joyce
White Vance, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Alabama, stated that
“Medicare benefits, including the hospice benefits, are intended only for
those individuals who are appropriately qualified . . . . We must protect the
public welfare and tax-funded benefits programs.”115
In response to the DOJ’s intervention decision, AseraCare published a
news release, which contained statements from its hospice president, chief
medical officer, and general counsel.116 In addition to denying the
allegations and emphasizing how unpredictable disease patterns and
progressions are, the statement from AseraCare’s General Counsel, David
Beck, noted that the lawsuit was “especially troubling because we believe it
could constrain certain patients—most notably those who suffer from

108
See United States’ Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss The Action or, in the
Alternative, to Dismiss Relators’ Complaint Originally Filed in 2:09-cv-00627-AKK at 3,
Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Oct. 24, 2012).
109
See Yeung, supra note 61; Consolidated Complaint in Intervention, U.S. ex rel.
Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2012).
110
See Consolidation Order at 2, U.S. ex rel. Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2012), (“The court finds that the cases should be
consolidated for discovery purposes pursuant to the court’s discussion with counsel at the
status conference.”).
111
See United States’ Consolidated Complaint in Intervention at 2, U.S. ex rel. Paradies
v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2012).
112
See Notice of Consolidation, Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l
Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv-00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Oct. 17, 2012) (for the three cases,
noting that “for all subsequent pleadings, please use case style contained in notice and
electronically file all pleadings in the lead case 2:12-cv-0245-KOB,” including associated
cases 2:12-cv-00245-KOB, 2:09-cv-00627-JOB, and 2:12-cv-02264-KOB).
113
U.S. Files Complaint Against National Chain of Hospice Providers, supra note 100.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
See AseraCare Hospice Responds to U.S. Attorney, supra note 96.
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unpredictable disease—from utilizing the hospice benefit.”117 The statement
highlighted that, under Medicare regulations, “two independent physicians”
must certify the patient’s eligibility, and that CMS, “which administers
hospice, ha[s] repeatedly stated that there is no limit to how long a patient
may remain under hospice care as long as the patient’s doctor certifies that a
patient is terminally ill and has a six-month prognosis.”118 Finally, noting
that CMS “has expressly recognized that a medical prognostication of life
expectancy is not always exact,” AseraCare management highlighted the fact
that “the federal government provided clear guidance that there is no limit
on how long an individual may receive hospice care as long as he or she
meets these eligibility criteria.”119
C. A Summary of the Allegations
For the instant presentation, the allegations presented below—which
include the multiple relators’ complaints and the federal government’s
intervention complaints—are divided into four categories: (1) wrongful
certification, in which AseraCare allegedly certified patients that should not
have been certified for hospice care; (2) alleged pressure on employees—
specifically that employees were unfairly pressured to push admission and
census-building over quality of care concerns; (3) enrollment shortcuts that
AseraCare allegedly employed in order to admit as many patients to the
hospice benefit as possible; and (4) other enrollment techniques that sought
to conceal AseraCare’s alleged hospice fraud. These four categories of
allegations are addressed in turn.
1. Wrongful Certification
The crux of the complaints focused on the allegation that AseraCare
had “knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare for hospice care for
patients who were not terminally ill.”120 Specifically, the DOJ’s complaint
alleged that AseraCare “milked Medicare’s hospice benefit by pressuring its
employees to enroll people into hospice who weren’t dying and resisted
discharging them despite evidence they weren’t deteriorating.”121 Along
these lines, one of the relators alleged that she was pressured “to admit nonqualifying patients” and “to dump problem patients without regard to

117
118
119
120

100.

Id.
Id at 1–2.
Id at 2.
See U.S. Files Complaint Against National Chain of Hospice Providers, supra note

121
See Jordan Rau, Lawsuit Accuses Company of Fraudulently Cycling Patients Through
Nursing Homes, Hospice Care, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Jan. 4, 2012),
http://khn.org/news/hospice-medicare-fraud-lawsuit-aseracare/.
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qualification.”122
These allegations centered around AseraCare’s purported efforts to
fraudulently increase Medicare reimbursements by over-enrolling patients in
hospice services.123 The DOJ’s “complaint outlined several cases in which
AseraCare allegedly kept elderly people despite evidence they weren’t
dying.”124 In addition to the hospice allegations, the relators alleged that
AseraCare “referred and re-referred” patients until Medicare had paid the
“maximum number of days of skilled nursing care, including rehabilitative
therapy . . . home health care, and hospice care.”125
Based on the complaint filed by relators Brown and Richardson, a
substantial amount of the individuals enrolled in the hospice benefit in
AseraCare’s south Alabama locations were allegedly discharged from the
program alive, with relators alleging that a “shockingly high percentage[] of
AseraCare’s patients [did] not die in six months.”126 Allegedly, “between
35.5% and 78.6% of AseraCare’s discharged patients were non-terminal in
south Alabama between 2005 and early 2009.”127 This was evidence of the
admission of patients who were not sick enough for the hospice benefit, the
relators alleged, and was clear proof of fraud perpetrated on the federal
government via the Medicare program.128

122

Qui Tam Complaint at 3, U.S. ex rel. Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245KOB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2009).
123
Id.
124
Rau, supra note 121 (according to government allegations, “[t]he patient admitted for
end-stage heart disease, which usually renders people unable to walk, was able to go to the
graduation and field trip even as he was kept on hospice for more than a year. When he was
finally discharged, it was because he needed treatment for other medical conditions . . . .”).
In a subsequent complaint, the government alleged that this individual also “went out with a
family friend and picked berries,” and, thirteen months after being admitted as a hospice
patient, “had no chest pain, was not using oxygen, and was still able to walk to the dining
room.” United States’ Consolidated Complaint in Intervention at 19–20, U.S. ex rel. Paradies
v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2012). This patient was
allegedly discharged fourteen months after entering the hospice program. Id. Another patient
“diagnosed with end-stage ‘debility,’ was not losing weight as is typically the case, according
to the legal filing, and instead went out for a trip to Wendy’s and another to go birdwatching.”
Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 53. A final patient was allegedly admitted to AseraCare’s
hospice program in April 2007. United States’ Consolidated Complaint in Intervention at 18,
U.S ex rel. Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2012).
As of September of 2009, the patient was still alive, and still enrolled in hospice. Id.
125
Qui Tam Complaint at 13, Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l
Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv-00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2009) (describing the alleged
“cycling” that has taken place at AseraCare).
126
Id. at 27–29.
127
Id. at 28.
128
Id. at 29.
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2. Pressure on Employees
The government alleged that AseraCare accomplished this fraud by
forcing its employees to constantly tend to and improve its enrollment
numbers. Specifically, the DOJ alleged that the company engaged in a
sustained pattern “of intensely pressuring employees to enroll as many
hospice patients as possible [and] setting high targets.”129 According to the
government’s allegations, AseraCare tied its staff’s “[j]ob retention” to
“maintaining census, or the number of patients for whom AseraCare could
bill Medicare or other insurance.”130 Drops in the census numbers (those
enrolled in hospice) worried staff members because the company had
allegedly threatened layoffs.131
As a result, staff members were allegedly hesitant to discharge patients
who did not seem to meet the hospice criteria out of fear of a “census”
decline.132 According to the allegations, AseraCare did not only threaten
layoffs, but also rewarded enrollment increases, as AseraCare’s
compensation and promotion structure was based on admissions.133 The
company’s Provider Relations Managers (PRMs) were allegedly
“compensated in direct proportion to the number of patients admitted and
billed to Medicare for [h]ospice treatment and [were] routinely terminated if
they fail[ed] to meet their monthly targeted number of referrals.”134
The company allegedly had a clear focus on attracting patients to its
program—not unlike many other for-profit health care companies, but
Aseracare’s efforts were aggressive. According to an individual who served
as chaplain for the company, an AseraCare director was described as one
who “would be like, ‘Get a patient, get a patient, get a patient,’” in an effort

129

Id.

Rau, supra note 121.
A regional sales director in 2007 was placed on a correction action plan
in part because his region failed to admit at least 33 people each week for
hospice care. In June 2006, the company offered a massage chair as a
prize to the employee who “[won] the game” by meeting its admission
goal and being the first to admit a patient in July . . . . An outside
auditor . . . suggested in a report that the company’s personnel policies
were affecting clinical decisions, . . . [and he noted that] since the
company laid employees off when the number of hospice patients
dwindled, workers were “resistant to patient discharge” even if the
patients no longer were eligible for Medicare hospice benefits.

130
United States’ Consolidated Complaint in Intervention at 13, U.S. ex rel. Paradies v.
AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2012).
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Qui Tam Complaint at 20, Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l
Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv-00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2009).
134
Id.
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to improve the company’s bottom line.135 An email written by one of the
company’s regional vice presidents demonstrated how much employees
were pushed to aggressively admit patients to AseraCare’s hospice
program.136 Additionally, AseraCare’s employees were allegedly pressed to
enroll more patients in its hospice program.137 According to the allegations,
it was common for AseraCare employees to “troll public hospitals, tour
public housing complexes[, and] ride along with Meals-on-Wheels food
deliveries” in an effort to seek more patients.138
When discussing hospice as an option with families and patients, the
relators’ complaint notes that AseraCare directed its employees “to ‘listen
for the yes.’”139 Further, allegedly, “AseraCare [h]ospice employees [were]
specifically taught by management to tell reluctant potential patients:
‘[w]hile you’re thinking about it’ enroll in hospice ‘just for a few days.’”140
Additionally, “officials gave advice to their recruiters on how to close a deal
with families who are ‘not ready yet’ for hospice.”141 Allegedly, Aseracare
directed its recruiters to emphasize “the urgency of a decision, and [to say]
things like, ‘[w]e only have [ten] minutes left.’”142 Finally, a training
presentation attached to the relators’ lawsuit pushed trainees to deploy key
phrases such as, “at least you’ll be covered at night,” and encouraged
employees to forcefully advocate for admission with phrases including, “try
us,” and “your doctor wants the best.”143

135
136

Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 53.
Id.
“In order to make our admission goal for the month, we are down to the
wire, and need today to be a huge admit day for every region,” a regional
vice president wrote in an e-mail, according to the lawsuit. “Mobilize
your teams, get them into the game this morning . . . when we call on
them, they always respond with referrals and a push to convert those
referrals into admits ASAP.”

Id.
Another email reflects the same aggressive business practice. According to the government’s
allegations, the director of operations for hospice Region 3 wrote the following: “The highest
admit day ever was in Region 1 with 16. We can get there too—today is the day for really
focused action. Go around the barriers and make this happen now, your families need you.”
United States’ Consolidated Complaint in Intervention at 12, U.S. ex rel. Paradies v.
AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2012).
137
See Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 53.
138
Yeung, supra note 61.
139
Qui Tam Complaint at 22, Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l
Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv-00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2009).
140
Id.
141
Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 53.
142
Id.
143
Qui Tam Complaint at 50, Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l
Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv-00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2009).
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3. Enrollment Shortcuts
Because of the pressure placed on admitting new enrollees into its
hospice program, AseraCare allegedly used shortcuts to ensure that
individuals could continue to be admitted to the program.144 For instance,
the government alleged that a nurse “was told on numerous occasions to
admit more patients” and that “[i]f this nurse determined that a patient did
not qualify for hospice under Medicare, she said that another nurse was sent
to re-evaluate the patient.”145 The government also alleged that admissions
nurses, and not physicians, regularly made hospice eligibility
determinations, in violation of Medicare rules.146
In at least one instance, AseraCare allegedly had a physician—who was
required to certify eligibility for hospice—”sign multiple Certifications of
Terminal Illness forms in blank and then use[] the pre-signed forms in
furtherance of billing Medicare for inadmissible patients.”147 In incredible
testimony, Roberta Manley, one of the relators and Aseracare’s Patient Care
Coordinator in Milwaukee between April 2007 and January 2008,
testified about how the medical director of that agency, Dr. Mateo,
“was doing his drawings” and “wasn’t participating” during the
interdisciplinary team meetings. She further testified that she
prepared for meetings by setting up Dr. Mateo’s sketch pad,
crayons, and coloring pencils and would present papers to Dr.
Mateo with “little stickies” where he should sign if he was present
to sign them or would use a pre-signed form if he was not at the
meeting.148
The plaintiffs also alleged that an AseraCare employee said that “a mere
suspicion that the patient had cancer or a lung disorder was sufficient to
admit the patient for a trial 90 day period.”149 If “the initial suspicion had
proven groundless,” then AseraCare employees were allegedly instructed to

144

See, e.g., United States’ Consolidated Complaint in Intervention at 13, U.S. ex rel.
Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00245-KOB (N.D. Ala. Nov. 2, 2012).
145
Id.
146
See id. at 14.
147
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief Under the False Claims Act at 7–8, U.S.
ex rel. Paradies v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00384-JPS (E.D. Wis. May 2, 2008) (also
noting that “Interdisciplinary Plans of Care (IPOC), which are billings to the United States,
are also pre-signed by physicians and submitted . . . in support of claims of payment”). This
allegation was also made in a relator’s complaint that “discretion is invariably left to nurses,
who then submit the paperwork for the signature of an M.D. in absentia without a direct
examination of the admitted [h]ospice patient.” Qui Tam Complaint at 23, Richardson and
Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv-00627-KOB (N.D.
Ala. Mar. 31, 2009).
148
AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1380–81 (N.D. Ala. 2015).
149
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief Under the False Claims Act at 12,
United States v. AseraCare, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00384-JPS (E.D. Wis. May 2, 2008).
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change the diagnosis to ensure that the patient remained enrolled in the
program.150
4. Muddying the Numbers
Finally, one of the relators alleged that she was pressured “to
aggressively target imminent-death patients in order to intentionally shrink
AseraCare’s average length of stay and average per patient expenditure, and
thus to evade detection of [the company’s] fraudulent billing of
Medicare.”151 According to the government, “AseraCare instruct[ed] its
nurses, nurse supervisors, and marketers to develop practices for identifying
and aggressively recruiting such ‘last breath’ patients.”152 It was also alleged
that employees were pushed to “solicit oncologists for ‘last breath’
referrals.”153 This way, according to the DOJ, AseraCare could be sure to
keep its average expenditures per patient and average days stayed in
AseraCare’s hospice programs low, so that its otherwise long stays would
not be noticed by federal regulators.
* * *
Based on the allegations in the FCA action referenced above, the DOJ
alleged that AseraCare fraudulently sought, and improperly received, $67.5
million in reimbursements from Medicare.154 Subject to the treble damages
150

Id.
Qui Tam Complaint at 3, Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l
Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv-00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2009).
152
Id. at 31. See also Whoriskey & Keating, supra note 53 (“In some cases, hospice
recruiters even specifically sought out ‘last-breath’ patients—those who would die quickly—
to bring their average down, according to the lawsuit.”).
153
Qui Tam Complaint at 32, Richardson and Brown ex rel. U.S. v. Golden Gate Nat’l
Senior Care LLC, No. 2:09-cv-00627-KOB (N.D. Ala. Mar. 31, 2009).
Vice President of Sales . . . advised Plaintiff-Relator . . . that she needed
to enroll more short length of stay patients . . . . [It was suggested that
the relator] should not attempt to persuade them that patients should
abandon chemotherapy for palliative care—which might cut into the
oncologists’ profits—but should rather solicit the doctors to refer their
patients to AseraCare in the last few days of their lives. In that way the
oncologists could maximize profits and AseraCare could maximize “last
breath” referrals and—by increasing the denominator of the Aggregate
Cap equation—allowable Medicare reimbursements. Under Defendants’
scheme, oncologists are encouraged by Defendants to impose on cancer
patients the horrific effects of aggressive chemotherapy until the patients
are on the verge of death—days or even hours from death and far past
legitimate hope of a cure—and then to refer the almost-dead patients to
AseraCare for enrollment for the sole purpose of shrinking AseraCare’s
average length of stay and fraudulently increasing its Aggregate Cap
amount, thereby disguising AseraCare’s fraudulent admission of other
non-qualifying patients.
Id.
154
See Kent Faulk, Whistleblower Trial: Did AseraCare Hospice Bill Medicare for
151
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provisions mandated by the FCA—but not including the per-claim penalties
required by the Act155—the DOJ sought more than $200 million from
AseraCare.156 This figure incorporated the time period during which the
fraudulent reimbursements allegedly occurred—just over four total years,
between January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2008, and January 1, 2009 to
February 28, 2011.157
D. The Trial
Adding to AseraCare’s intrigue has been its uncommon procedural
history. In May of 2015, Chief Judge Bowdre bifurcated the trial,158
separating the issue of falsity from a separate phase “on all other issues and
claims, including the knowledge and damage elements of the [g]overnment’s
claims.”159 This first phase of the trial, which focused exclusively on the
falsity requirement under the FCA, began on August 10, 2015.160 This
phase—which focused its analysis on 121 patients—ended in mid-

Patients Who Weren’t About to Die?, AL.COM (Aug. 9, 2015, 10:47 AM),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/08/whistleblower_trial_were_nond.html.
155
Those penalties were adjusted upwards as of August 2016. See False Claims Act
Penalties Double as of August 1, 2016, NAT’L L. REV. (July 19, 2016),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/false-claims-act-penalties-double-august-1-2016 (“As
of August 1, 2016, False Claims Act civil penalties increase to between $10,781.40 and
$21,562.80 per claim, plus three times the amount of damages that the federal government
sustains because of the false claim.”).
156
See Kent Faulk, $202 Million AseraCare Medicare Fraud Case Starts Aug. 3 DOJ
Says,
AL.COM
(July
10,
2015),
http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/07/company_could_owe_more_than_2
0.html. The $202 million damages amount sought by the DOJ was the result of a random
sample:
The DOJ came to that dollar amount through an analysis of random
samples of 2,181 AseraCare patients for whom the company billed
Medicare for at least 365 days of continuous hospice care. . . . More
than half of the 233 cases in the random samples should have been
deemed ineligible for hospice, the DOJ argued.
Id.
157
Id.
158
This was a controversial decision. See Peter S. Spivack, Stephanie L. Carman, &
Natalie T. Sinicrope, 5 Important Lessons from AseraCare’s FCA Case, LAW360 (Mar. 9,
2016, 11:03 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/768839/5-important-lessons-fromaseracare-s-fca-case (noting that the case was bifurcated into two phases—a phase one that
focused on falsity, and a phase two that focused on intent and other FCA issues—and
describing the decision and procedural posture of the case as “uncharted waters.”) Indeed,
the AseraCare “court’s decision to bifurcate the trial was preceded—and likely influenced—
by a controversial decision: to allow the government to use statistical sampling and
extrapolation in its efforts to prove falsity and calculate potential damages.” Id.
159
AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1377 (N.D. Ala. 2015).
160
Id. at 1379.
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October.161 At the conclusion of the phase, the “jury answered . . .
interrogatories and found that AseraCare submitted false claims for 104 of
the patients during some or all of their hospice stay.”162 Following the jury
verdict, the court was prepared to move on to the subsequent phase of the
trial, during which the jury was set to look at whether AseraCare violated the
intent requirement under the FCA, specifically to “examine whether
AseraCare knowingly submitted false claims.”163
But the AseraCare case did not proceed in this typical fashion.
Following the jury’s decision in October, Chief Judge Bowdre issued a
memorandum order in which she effectively overturned the jury’s findings
due to incorrect jury instructions. This was followed by an even more
stunning opinion in March of 2016. Both of these opinions are presented
below.
1. The November 2015 Opinion
Less than two weeks after the jury returned a finding of falsity for 104
of the 121 patients examined in the AseraCare case, and in a surprising turn
of events,164 Chief Judge Bowdre ordered a new trial.165 Granting
Aseracare’s motion for a new trial because “she had given the jury
‘incomplete’ instructions before their deliberations in the first phase of the
trial,”166 Chief Judge Bowdre reopened the issue due to what amounted to a
jury instruction error. According to a report about the case:
AseraCare attorneys last week had asked [Chief Judge] Bowdre
for a new trial after she stated she realized she had committed
‘major reversible error’ in the jury instructions, according to a
court document filed today by DOJ attorneys. [Chief Judge]
Bowdre granted AseraCare’s motion on the ground that she had
failed to provide the jury with a “sufficient legal standard for
evaluating the case,” according to the document. Specifically,
[Chief Judge] Bowdre said today that she had not included
essential statements of the False Claims Act law in her jury
instructions, including that claims are not false under that law
when reasonable persons can disagree on whether the hospice care
161

See Kent Faulk, AseraCare Hospice Trial with $200 Million at Stake Gets Do-Over,
AL.COM (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.al.com/news/birmingham/index.ssf/2015/10/federal_
judge_halts_aseracare.html.
162
AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1379.
163
Lisa Schencker, Hospice Company AseraCare Loses First Round of False Claims
Trial, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/2015
1015/NEWS/151019935.
164
Faulk, supra note 161 (quoting a practitioner as finding the reversal as “somewhat
surprising”).
165
Id.
166
Id.
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was properly billed to the government.167
Further, the Court filed a memorandum opinion on November 3, 2015, in
which it formally granted AseraCare’s motion for a new trial.168 Chief Judge
Bowdre candidly began the order by noting that, as the FCA “is still
developing” and that “[m]any key issues remain undecided,” the court had
provided insufficient instructions to the jury.169 In a nod to the rapidlydeveloping standards in medical necessity-based FCA cases, Chief Judge
Bowdre emphasized the “uncharted” nature of the government’s allegations
in the case.170
Specifically, the Judge noted that, following the initial jury finding, the
court “had serious questions as to whether the [g]overnment had proven an
objective falsehood . . . .”171 And, upon review, Chief Judge Bowdre felt that
the instructions given did not convey the appropriately high standard that
courts must impose on the government pursuing medical necessity-based
fraud cases.172 Specifically, Chief Judge Bowdre wrote that
the court became convinced that it committed reversible error in
the instructions it provided to the jury. The court concluded that
it should have advised the jury that (1) “the FCA requires ‘proof
of an objective falsehood,’” and (2) a mere difference of opinion,
without more, is not enough to show falsity.173
Consequently, Chief Judge Bowdre noted that the “failure to instruct the jury
on these key points of law was reversible error.”174
Foreshadowing what was to come in 2016, the court noted that it was
“convinced that the law is clear: a difference of opinion is not enough.”175
The court had told the jury that “a claim is ‘false’ if it is an assertion that is
untrue when made or when used,” and that “practices that may be improper,
167

Id.
AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372, 1377 (N.D. Ala. 2015).
169
Id. at 1375 (“One of the undecided areas of law in the Eleventh Circuit is the legal
standard for falsity in a case like this one, where the [g]overnment alleges that the hospice
provider’s medical records do not support its hospice eligibility certifications, and, therefore,
the certifications are false. This case does not involve the types of false claims for which the
legal standard is well-established: the hospice provider forged physicians’ signatures, billed
for services that it did not perform, or submitted claims for fictitious patients. In traversing
this uncharted territory, the court has carefully considered each of the novel issues presented
by this case, and has attempted to render its decisions in a way that aligns with the current
state of the law. Nonetheless, the court misstepped. The court committed reversible error in
failing to provide the jury with complete instructions as to what was legally necessary for it
to find that the claims before it were false.”).
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1381.
172
Id.
173
Id. (citations omitted).
174
AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1381.
175
Id.
168
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standing alone, are insufficient to show falsity without proof that specific
claims were in fact false when submitted to Medicare.”176 Again, the court
noted its mistake: “[t]hese instructions, while correct statements, were
incomplete. The instructions that the court gave did not fully advise the jury
about the standard it must apply to find that AseraCare submitted false
claims.”177
Finally, the court drew on past precedent to note that scientific
judgments and medical opinions “about which reasonable minds may differ
cannot be false.”178 The fact that CMS relied upon the doctor’s certification
for hospice, which features individual clinical judgment, bolstered Chief
Judge Bowdre’s conclusion that the hospice certification statement is a
judgment or opinion that does not lend itself well to the FCA’s falsity
standard.179 “This guidance from CMS,” the Chief Judge wrote, “shows that
physicians applying their clinical judgment about a patient’s projected life
expectancy could disagree, and neither physician would be wrong.”180
In effect, Chief Judge Bowdre’s conclusion on the FCA requirements
in the November 2015 case cracked open a potentially radical defense for
providers targeted by the FCA for a medical necessity-based fraud claim.
This argument features the potentiality that if the provider can couch his or
her disagreement with Medicare as a reasonable clinical disagreement, then
the FCA—dependent upon falsity and intent—may be limited in application.
Consequently, it seems, in this area, medical disagreement—as long as it is
reasonable and supported—can serve to immunize providers from FCA
enforcement.
2. The March 2016 Opinion
In a straightforward and striking opinion in the spring of 2016, Chief
Judge Bowdre tossed the lawsuit, granting summary judgment in favor of
AseraCare.181 Put simply, Chief Judge Bowdre disagreed with the
government’s characterization of the case. Responding to “[g]overnment
claims that the medical records of the 123 patients at issue in this case do not
contain ‘clinical information and other documentation that support [this]
medical prognosis,’ and thus, AseraCare’s claims for those patients were
176

Id. at 1382 (citations omitted).
Id.
178
Id. at 1383.
179
Id.
180
AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. 3d at 1384 (“The case law, the regulations, and even the
testimony of the [g]overnment’s witnesses support the court’s conclusion that it should have
instructed the jury that a mere difference of opinions among physicians, without more, is
insufficient to show falsity under the False Claims Act.”).
181
United States v. AseraCare Inc. (AseraCare II), 176 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1284 (N.D. Ala.
2016).
177
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‘false,’” Chief Judge Bowdre noted that the case could be characterized by
“conflicting views of physicians about whether the medical records support
AseraCare’s certifications that the patients at issue were eligible for hospice
care.”182 Chief Judge Bowdre noted that “[w]hen hospice certifying
physicians and medical experts look at the very same medical records and
disagree about whether the medical records support hospice eligibility, the
opinion of one medical expert alone cannot prove falsity without further
evidence of an objective falsehood.”183 Further, when it comes to the FCA,
as she noted in the November 2015 opinion, “[a] mere difference of opinion
between physicians, without more, is not enough to show falsity.”184 Instead,
“all that exists is a difference of opinion.”185
In her opinion, Chief Judge Bowdre seemed keenly aware of the
potentially wide reach of the FCA, noting that “[t]he court [was] concerned
that allowing a mere difference of opinion among physicians alone to prove
falsity would totally eradicate the clinical judgment required of the certifying
physicians.”186 The court further noted that the certification—based upon
the clinical expertise of a physician—was a vital component of the hospice
certification process, and that enabling the government to prove falsity
through a clinical disagreement would allow the government to “shortcircuit” the falsity requirement within the FCA.187 “If the court were to find
that all the [g]overnment needed to prove falsity in a hospice provider case
was one medical expert who reviewed the medical records and disagreed
with the certifying physician,” the court found, “hospice providers would be
subject to potential FCA liability any time the [g]overnment could find a
medical expert who disagreed with the certifying physician’s clinical
judgment. The court refuses to go down that road.”188

182

Id. at 1283 (citations omitted).
Id.
184
Id. The Court also noted that “AseraCare’s medical experts, as well as the certifying
physicians, also reviewed the same medical records and found that they did support the
[certifications of terminal illness] of the patients at issue. The court finds that contradiction
based on clinical judgment or opinion alone cannot constitute falsity under the FCA as a
matter of law.” Id. at 1286.
185
Id. at 1285 (“When two or more medical experts look at the same medical records and
reach different conclusions about whether those medical records support the certifying
physicians’ [Certifications of Terminal Illness], all that exists is a difference of opinion. This
difference of opinion among experts regarding the patients’ hospice eligibility alone is not
enough to prove falsity, and the [g]overnment has failed to point the court to any objective
evidence of falsity.” (emphasis in original)).
186
Id.
187
AseraCare II, 176 F. Supp. 3d at 1285.
188
Id.
183
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* * *
Chief Judge Bowdre’s surprising March 2016 opinion became a focal
point for the health law industry, with many in the provider community
celebrating the decision.189 Whether Chief Judge Bowdre’s holding stands,
however, is still to be determined. The DOJ has filed an appeal in the
AseraCare case that is pending before the Eleventh Circuit at the time of this
writing,190 and oral arguments were held in 2017.191 Nevertheless, no matter
the outcome of the appeal of the AseraCare case, the legal reasoning
employed and the perspective of the FCA shared in the case by Chief Judge
Bowdre has already had an impact on other courts’ treatment of the FCA and
its falsity requirement, especially in cases alleging a lack of medical
necessity.
V. HETEROGENEITY AS AN ANTAGONIST TO FRAUD
AseraCare was not the first—and certainly will not be the last—federal
court case to apply a stringent falsity requirement to the detriment of relators
in health care FCA cases. Noteworthy cases drew attention before
AseraCare’s 2016 result, and at least two federal court decisions have relied
on and extended the AseraCare conception of falsity under the FCA. The
more recent of these two decisions—which was overturned by an appellate
court in 2018—had, at the time, led practitioners to claim that the tie between
the FCA and medical necessity was “increasingly tenuous,” clearly

189

See, e.g., Kathleen McDermott & Howard J. Young, False Claims Act Trial Sets
Precedent for Future Cases, MORGAN LEWIS LAWFLASH (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/false-claims-act-trial-sets-precedent-for-future-cases
(noting that Chief Judge Bowdre’s decision “explains and resolves this important FCA legal
issue with elegant and devastating simplicity, ensuring that the decision will be a strong and
influential precedent[,]” and calling the case a “notable defeat for the government’s assertion
of FCA liability against healthcare providers”); Michael L. Waldman & Eric A. White,
AseraCare Puts ‘False Claims’ Back in the False Claims Act, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 18,
2016), https://www.bna.com/aseracare-puts-false-n73014444927/ (calling the AseraCare
decision a “possible common-sense reawakening”). Further, lawyers have noted that
“[h]ealthcare providers are understandably frustrated to have legitimate clinical
disagreements labeled as fraudulent practices with no nexus to actual false claims or any
evidence of objective falsehood related to a claim.” McDermott & Young, supra note 189.
See also Schencker, supra note 88 (“If a medical professional says, ‘Here are the criteria, and
in my professional opinion, I believe this person is appropriate for hospice care,’ that, I
believe, should constitute a barrier to fraud prosecution,” and noting that he “believes hospices
shouldn’t face fraud liability just because another medical professional may reasonably
disagree with it certifications.”) (quoting Mark Silberman, a partner at Duane Morris).
190
See AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372 (N.D. Ala. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 1613004 (11th Cir. 2016).
191
See False Claims Act Standard for Falsity of Medicare Hospice Claims Debated on
Appeal, LEXIS LEGAL NEWS, (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.lexislegalnews.com/articles/1650
7/false-claims-act-standard-for-falsity-of-medicare-hospice-claims-debated-on-appeal.
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“welcome news for health care providers.”192 Nonetheless, the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in 2018 has undoubtedly muddied the falsity analysis.193
A. The Siblings and Progeny of AseraCare
These cases are U.S. ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc.,194 decided
in 2005 by the Tenth Circuit, U.S. ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care,195
decided by the District Court for the Northern District of Texas in 2016, and
U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital,196 heard and decided by the
District Court for the District of Utah in 2017, and overturned by the Tenth
Circuit in 2018,197 which demonstrates the instability of case law in this area.
All three cases are summarized briefly below.
1. U.S. ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc.
Eleven years before Chief Judge Bowdre’s opinion in AseraCare, a
three-judge panel of the Tenth Circuit applied a similar analysis regarding
the FCA’s falsity requirement.198 In a case with unique facts, relators—
parents of a prematurely-born infant who needed medical treatment—
alleged that their private insurance plan wrongly denied coverage for
treatment, and “directed” them to “file the claims with Medicaid.”199
Therefore, because of the plan’s allegedly wrongful refusal, Medicaid
covered the services, and the parents alleged that the statement constituted
Medicaid fraud.200 Due to the wrongful denial of coverage, they argued, the
Medicaid program paid for services for which it should not have paid.201
The District Court dismissed the complaint due to its failure to allege a
false or fraudulent claim, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.202 In its analysis,
192
See Rebecca C. Martin & Laura McLane, The FCA and Medical Necessity: An
Increasingly Tenuous Relationship, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY: FCA UPDATE (Feb. 7,
2017), http://www.fcaupdate.com/2017/02/the-fca-and-medical-necessity-an-increasinglytenuous-relationship/ (“In cases where the FCA is used by the government and relators to
monitor and attempt to punish allegedly ‘fraudulent’ conduct that, in reality, involves
questions of physician judgment, Polukoff’s adoption of AseraCare’s logic gives added
weight to arguments against liability premised on disagreements over clinical decisionmaking”).
193
U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018).
194
U.S. ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc., 139 F. App’x. 980 (10th Cir. 2005).
195
U.S. ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07–cv–00604–M, 2016 WL
3449833 (N.D Tex. June 20, 2016).
196
See U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., No. 2:16–cv–00304–JNP–EJF, 2017
WL 237615 (D. Utah Jan. 19, 2017), rev’d, 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018).
197
Id.
198
See Morton, 139 F. App’x. at 980.
199
Id. at 981.
200
Id.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 982.
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the Tenth Circuit noted that the scienter and falsity showings required under
the FCA were “inseparable.”203 While taking a harder line on the FCA falsity
requirement, and citing other FCA cases, the court noted that, to find FCA
liability, what is required is an “objective falsehood,” and “a lie.”204
Rejecting the relators’ attempt to prove falsity, the court noted that
“liability under the FCA must be predicated on an objectively verifiable
fact.”205 Further, the court noted that the clinical determination was not
“susceptible to proof of truth or falsity” and that “not all clinical diagnoses
and characterizations of medical care are intrinsically ambiguous,” but called
the care at issue in the case “inherently ambiguous.”206 As a result, the Tenth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ challenge did not fall within the
parameters of the FCA, and that the relators could not show the requisite
falsity to maintain an FCA action.207 Dismissal with prejudice by the District
Court was appropriate, and the order was affirmed.208 In a subsequent
opinion, nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit has limited the application of this
holding, “cabin[ing it] to the facts in that case.”209
2. United States ex rel. Wall v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc.
The relator in Vista Hospice Care, a social worker employed for two
years by Vista Hospice (“Vista”), alleged that Vista had violated the AntiKickback Statute (AKS),210 the FCA, and the Texas Medicaid Fraud
203

Id.
Morton, 139 F. App’x. at 982.
205
Id. at 983 (The court also noted that “we are not prepared to conclude that in all
instances, merely because the verification of a fact relies upon clinical medical judgments, or
involves a decision of coverage under an ERISA plan, the fact cannot form the basis of an
FCA claim.”).
206
Id. at 983–84. The court quoted Wang v. FMC Corp., noting “[t]he Act is concerned
about ferreting out ‘wrongdoing,’ not scientific errors. What is false as a matter of science is
not, by that very fact, wrong as a matter of morals.” 975 F.2d 1412, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Wang court noted that “[t]he Act would not put either Ptolemy or Copernicus on trial.”
Id.
207
Morton, 139 F. App’x. at 984.
208
Id.
209
U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730, 742 (10th Cir. 2018).
210
The Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS), a federal criminal anti-fraud statute, reads (in
relevant part) as follows:
(1) Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any remuneration (including
any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind—
(A) in return for referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole
or in part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or recommending
purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which
payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
204
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Prevention Act (TMFPA),211 alleging a scheme to wrongfully enroll and bill
for hospice services for allegedly ineligible individuals.212 In a decision
written by Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn, the court granted Vista’s motion for
summary judgment for each claim, except for an allegation of retaliation.213
Notably for the instant analysis, Vista focused on the testimony of the
relator’s expert witness, Dr. Karl Steinberg, and in addition to seeking
dismissal of the false claims allegations, Vista sought to strike the expert’s
testimony.214 In a passage that bears a similarity to the analysis in
AseraCare, Judge Lynn noted that “an FCA claim about the exercise of
[clinical] judgment must be predicated on the presence of an objectively
verifiable fact at odds with the exercise of that judgment, not a matter of
questioning subjective clinical analysis.”215 Further, the court provided
examples of what would be sufficient.216
For example, a relator could present evidence that a certifying
physician was not, in fact, exercising the physician’s clinical
judgment when certifying a patient, because the physician never
reviewed the patient’s medical condition nor saw the patient, or
that the physician did not actually believe that if the patient’s
disease ran its normal course, the patient had a prognosis of six
months or less. A testifying physician’s disagreement with a
certifying physician’s prediction of life expectancy is not enough
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(2) Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any remuneration (including any
kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind
to any person to induce such person—
(A) to refer an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the
furnishing of any item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in
part under a Federal health care program, or
(B) to purchase, lease, order, or arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or
ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2018).
211
See TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001–36.132 (West 2015). The Texas Medicaid
Fraud Prevention Act (TMFPA) is known as a state-level analog to the federal FCA. See,
e.g., U.S. ex rel. Bates v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. CIV.A. 12-7199, 2014 WL 4384503, at *10
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2014) (noting that the “[r]elator has alleged violations of 28 state and
municipal laws analogous to the federal False Claims Act,” and citing the TMFPA allegations
as one of the “analogous” state laws).
212
United States v. Vista Hospice Care, Inc., No. 3:07-cv-00604-M, 2016 WL 3449833,
at *1 (N.D Tex. June 20, 2016).
213
Id. at *27.
214
Id. at *1.
215
Id. at *17.
216
Id.
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to show falsity.217
Further, mirroring the concern that was later expressed in AseraCare, Judge
Lynn painted the hypothetical that unknowing providers could find
themselves targeted by the DOJ following a situation in which an expert
reviewer disagreed with their clinical decisions.
If all that was necessary to prove falsity was to put up a medical
expert to review medical records and provide an opinion at odds
with that of the certifying physician, hospice providers would be
subject to potential FCA liability “any time [a relator] could find
a medical expert who disagreed with the certifying physician’s
clinical judgment.” That situation would be directly at odds with
the assurances given by CMS that doctors need not fear the
exercise of their medical judgment as to the future course of a
terminal patient.218
The court noted that the relator did not sufficiently allege causation, as he
failed to draw a connection between the patients that were reviewed by the
expert, Dr. Steinberg, and the claims for which Vista sought
reimbursement.219 Finding these deficiencies fatal to the relator’s claim, the
court dismissed the false claims allegations based on the same reasoning as
Judge Bowdre’s decision in AseraCare.220
3. United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital
Nearly one year after Chief Judge Bowdre’s decision in AseraCare, the
District Court for the District of Utah granted a motion to dismiss with
prejudice in U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hospital.221 Another decision
to grab the attention of the defense bar, in writing about the St. Mark’s
Hospital case, attorney commentators have noted that the case represents
another reminder of how a case like St. Mark’s Hospital, “in reality, involves
questions of physician judgment,” and “gives added weight to arguments
against liability premised on disagreements over clinical decisionmaking.”222

217

Id. (citations omitted).
Vista Hospice Care, 2016 WL 3449833, at *18 (citation omitted).
219
Id. (“Although Relator has produced some evidence of the Defendants’ pressure on
their employees to admit large numbers of hospice patients, and that a few employees falsified
data on a few specified patient charts, a practice that could jeopardize the proper exercise of
physician judgment, she has not tied that evidence to the patients whose charts Dr. Steinberg
evaluated, nor to the submission of a single false claim. Relator concedes that she cannot do
so.”).
220
Id. at *21.
221
See U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., No. 2:16–cv–00304–JNP–EJF, 2017
WL 237615 (D. Utah Jan. 19, 2017), rev’d, 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018).
222
Martin & McLane, supra note 192.
218
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In short, the relator in St. Mark’s Hospital alleged that a cardiologist
“performed unnecessary medical procedures and then billed the federal
government for some of these procedures.”223 Further, according to the
relator’s allegations, Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. and Intermountain
Medical Center (collectively referred to as “IHC”), and St. Mark’s Hospital
(“St. Mark’s”), “fraudulently billed the government for costs associated with
these unnecessary procedures.”224 Specifically, the allegations focused on a
procedure called “patent foramen ovale (PFO) closure,”225 which is
performed in an effort to prevent the patient from suffering a stroke.226
Importantly to the District Court and Judge Jill N. Parrish, the clinical
expertise surrounding whether or not a PFO closure would prevent a patient
from suffering a stroke was subject to shifting clinical opinion.227
Specifically, as the court mentioned, both the American Heart Association
(AHA) and the American Stroke Association (ASA) had changed their
guidance documents in the last decade, and Medicare had no National
Coverage Determination (NCD) for the procedure.228 As a result, the court
noted that no clear clinical consensus existed for the procedure.229
The relator’s argument centered on the fact that because the procedures
must have been medically necessary and reasonable in order to be
reimbursable by Medicare, and because the care could not have been
medically necessary, the representation was false, and therefore, the
cardiologist violated the FCA.230 Citing the Tenth Circuit’s decision in
Morton and the Northern District of Alabama’s 2016 decision in AseraCare,
the District Court required proof that the “defendants knowingly made an
objectively false representation to the government that caused the

223

See St. Mark’s Hosp., 2017 WL 237615, at *1.
Id. The court noted that the relator alleged that Dr. Sorensen fraudulently administered
the procedure to patients, and that “the hospital defendants [through] their managing agents
knew that Dr. Sorensen was performing allegedly medically unnecessary procedures in their
facilities, but billed the government for costs associated with these procedures anyway.” Id.
at *6.
225
Id. at *1.
226
Id. (“The foramen ovale is a small opening in the wall separating the two upper
chambers of the heart found in a fetus as it develops in the womb. In about 75% of the
population, the opening closes soon after birth. In the other 25% of the population, the
opening never closes. Except in rare cases, this condition is asymptomatic. But an adult with
a PFO has an increased risk of suffering a stroke because blood clots that would otherwise
have lodged in the lungs during pulmonary circulation may instead leak through the PFO,
enter the systemic circulatory pathway, and lodge in the brain. A PFO may be closed through
a percutaneous surgical procedure.”).
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
St. Mark’s Hosp., 2017 WL 237615, at *1.
230
Id. at *8.
224
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government to remit payment.”231
On that front, the court did not agree with the relator that the
certification of the reasonableness and necessity of the PFO closures was
“objectively false” under the meaning of the FCA.232 In its most important
passage:
[t]hese representations, however, cannot be proven to be
objectively false. Opinions, medical judgments, and “conclusions
about which reasonable minds may differ cannot be false” for the
purposes of an FCA claim. Moreover, liability may not be
premised on subjective interpretations of imprecise statutory
language such as “medically reasonable and necessary.” Dr.
Polukoff alleges that some of the PFO closures performed were
medically unreasonable and unnecessary because they were
performed on patients with an elevated risk of stroke but who had
not yet suffered a stroke or to treat chronic migraines. But similar
to the medical decisions at issue in Morton, these allegations are
based on subjective medical opinions that cannot be proven to be
objectively false.233
In attempting to show that the cardiologist administered care that was not
medically necessary, and by implication, that the reimbursement sought for
that care was false, Dr. Polukoff relied on the AHA/ASA standards to prove
that the care was lacking in medical necessity.234 But the court rejected the
argument, noting that Medicare did not require compliance with the
professional standard in order to reimburse for the care at issue.235 For this
argument, the court relied on the seminal Mikes v. Straus decision from the
Second Circuit in 2001.236 Consequentially, the court noted that “even if Dr.
Polukoff could show that [the cardiologist] did not comply with the relevant
AHA/ASA standards, this does not support a claim that [the cardiologist]’s
certification that the PFO closures were medically necessary was objectively
false.”237
231

Id. at *8–9 (citing U.S. ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc., 139 F. App’x. 980, 982
(10th Cir. 2005); AseraCare II, 176 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2016)).
232
St. Mark’s Hosp., 2017 WL 237615, at *8–9.
233
Id. at *9 (citations omitted).
234
Id. at *10.
235
Id. (citing Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 468 (6th Cir. 2011)).
236
Id. The Court in St. Mark’s Hospital quoted arguably the most important sentence
from Straus, noting that “[t]he term ‘medical necessity’ does not impart a qualitative element
mandating a particular standard of medical care, and [the relator] does not point to any legal
authority requiring us to read such a mandate into the form.” Id.
237
Id. In a footnote, the court noted that the guidelines do not speak to whether or not the
procedure was recommended to treat migraines, the treatment plan Dr. Sorensen was
following. See id. at *10 n.7. (“Although the 2006 and 2011 recommendations may give rise
to a permissible inference that a prior stroke is a prerequisite to a PFO closure, the AHA/ASA
never explicitly states that a patient with an elevated risk of strokes should not receive the
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The court then noted that Medicare remained free—through the
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)—to establish a standard in
this area of clinical practice through the national coverage determination
(NCD) process to allay any confusion that exists within the provider
community.238 The court concluded by dismissing the claim with
prejudice—denying the relator’s request of leave to amend his complaint—
but not before a noteworthy rebuke of the relator’s attempted theory of
liability.239 In a sweeping passage, Judge Parrish noted that
[i]n the absence of an objective standard created by the
government, Dr. Polukoff can only rely upon the subjective and
ambiguous “reasonable and necessary” standard. Any attempt to
prove that the defendants have violated this standard by seeking
payment for PFO closures must necessarily rest on evidence of
medical opinions and subjective standards of care rather than
objectively false representations. But as the Tenth Circuit held in
Morton, the punitive provisions of the FCA—including treble
damages and attorney fees—cannot be applied absent an
objectively false representation. Therefore, Mr. Polukoff’s FCA
claims fail as a matter of law and the court dismisses all causes of
action asserted against the defendants.240
Throughout this section, Judge Parrish seemed to call into question the
validity of a substantial amount of FCA actions that had been maintained in
recent years that hinged on the definition and understanding of medical
necessity. Indeed, an FCA action that rests on a theory of liability that the
care administered was not medically necessary is purportedly based upon
“evidence of medical opinions and subjective standards of care.”241 The
decision seemed to immediately change the calculus for targeted parties,
relators, and the United States government in litigating these cases and
considering settlement.
But the Tenth Circuit reversed Judge Parrish’s decision in mid-2018.242
Reversing and remanding the lower court, the Tenth Circuit found that
medical necessity determinations can be false—adopting a broad reading of
the FCA243—”if the procedure was not reasonable and necessary under the
government’s definition of the phrase.”244 Recognizing that “a broad
procedure. In the absence of a clear prohibition, even if Dr. Sorensen had represented that he
had complied with AHA/ASA guidelines, such a representation would not be objectively
false.”).
238
St. Mark’s Hosp., 2017 WL 237615, at *10.
239
Id. at *11–12.
240
Id. at *10.
241
Id.
242
U.S. ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s Hosp., 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018).
243
Id. at 742-43.
244
Id. at 743.

FOMATTED - BUCK - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

40

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/1/2018 1:14 PM

[Vol. 49:1

definition of ‘false or fraudulent’ might expose doctors to more liability
under the FCA,” the court pointed to the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in
Universal Health Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, which highlighted
the importance of proof of materiality and scienter in FCA cases.245 Whether
or not Escobar provides an important backstop in these cases, the decision
illustrated the rolling legal standards in this area.
B. The Problem of Reasonable Clinical Judgment
As the AseraCare case waits on appellate resolution, recent case law
shows that the application of the FCA to medical necessity-based fraud may
be in the midst of a reorganization. Indeed, the government has entered into
a litany of settlements in recent years with doctors, hospitals, and skilled
nursing facilities that have resolved medical necessity-based fraud
allegations.246 These settled cases sent a strong message to the provider
community that a failure to demonstrate or defend the medical necessity of
an administered procedure or product constitutes a false claim. Care that is
administered that is allegedly not medically necessary has—with few
exceptions—been enough for the government to achieve FCA settlements.247
But those are settled cases, and within medical necessity-based cases
that make it in front of a judge or jury, “most courts have acknowledged that
245

Id.
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Dignity Health
Agrees to Pay $37 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations (Oct. 30, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/dignity-health-agrees-pay-37-million-settle-false-claims-actallegations (documenting the settlement of allegations “that 13 of [Dignity Health’s] hospitals
in California, Nevada and Arizona knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare and
TRICARE by admitting patients who could have been treated on a less costly, outpatient
basis”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nation’s Largest Nursing Home Therapy
Provider, Kindred/Rehabcare to Pay $125 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations
(Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nation-s-largest-nursing-home-therapyprovider-kindredrehabcare-pay-125-million-resolve-false (discussing an agreement settling
allegations that companies “violated the False Claims Act by knowingly causing skilled
nursing facilities (SNFs) to submit false claims to Medicare for rehabilitation therapy services
that were not reasonable, necessary and skilled, or that never occurred”); DOJ: Orthopedic
Surgery Practice Agrees to Settle False Claims Act Allegations, NEWS4JAX (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://www.news4jax.com/news/local/jacksonville/doj-orthopedic-surgery-practice-agreesto-settle-false-claims-act-allegations (documenting that, among other allegations, an
orthopedic medical group “used and billed for ultrasound-guided injections routinely even in
the absence of medical necessity”); Kurt Eichenwald, Tenet Healthcare Paying $54 Million
in
Fraud
Settlement,
N.Y.
TIMES:
TIMESMACHINE
(Aug.
7,
2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/07/business/tenet-healthcare-paying-54-million-in-fraudsettlement.html (noting that the settlement was entered into “to resolve government
accusations that doctors at a hospital in Northern California conducted unnecessary heart
procedures and operations on hundreds of patients” and that the “settlement is the largest in a
case [at the time] involving what is known as medical necessity fraud, or billing government
health programs for tests and treatments that the patient’s condition did not require”).
247
See, e.g., Eichenwald, supra note 246.
246
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‘liability under the FCA . . . must be predicated on an objectively verifiable
fact.’”248 This becomes a difficult challenge, especially when trying to
determine whether “a statement or certification by a physician or other
practitioner that a service or item is medically necessary objectively false,
and what must the government or the relator allege and prove to establish a
knowingly false certification or statement.”249 Of course, the challenge
involves the intersection between the “objective falsehood” requirement and
the “subjective judgment on which medical experts, may, in many cases,
reasonably disagree”—which often can be the hallmark of a medical
necessity determination.250
As a result, like in AseraCare, if courts conclude that FCA claims based
on reasonable opinions of medical necessity are not typically actionable—
even if those decisions could be deemed negligent—well-settled FCA
applications seem to be at risk.251 Nonetheless, medical necessity statements
can be “objective falsehoods” if they conflict with clearly known facts, are
completely unsupportable, or depend upon false information that was
knowingly submitted.252
Consequently, the predominant challenge of prosecuting a medical
necessity-based fraud case becomes mapping an intent-based fraud statute
onto the heterogeneous and complex world of clinical decision-making. If
the DOJ focuses on the clinical care at issue—that is, that some care is
medically necessary and that other care is fraudulent—then the clinical
decisions that are somewhere between the poles on that continuum are hard
to define. This challenge invites courts to opt for clear, simple rules in this
foggy area—which explains the enticing cleanliness present in dismissing a
medical necessity-based FCA claim due to a “mere” clinical disagreement
between doctors.253
But, while simple, this may not fully represent the precedent, structure,
and common usage of the FCA. It is an odd paradox to claim that, due to
medical complexity, the DOJ would be unable to prove that a clinical
decision lacks medical necessity in any case—i.e., that any clinical decisionmaker is subject to yawning and unverifiable medical heterogeneity—but it
seems that this conclusion may be the import of AseraCare and some of its
248

Michael W. Youtt, H. Victor Thomas, & Adam Robison, The FCA and Fraudulent
Opinions of Medical Necessity, 32 A.B.A GP SOLO, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 2015, at 74 (quoting
U.S. ex rel. Morton v. A Plus Benefits, Inc., 139 F. App’x. 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2005)).
249
Id. at 75.
250
Id. at 74.
251
Id. 74–75 (“Courts have recognized that mere differences of scientific or medical
opinions are not actionable under the FCA.”).
252
Id. at 75.
253
See AseraCare I, 153 F. Supp. 3d 1372 (N.D. Ala. 2015), appeal docketed, No. 1613004 (11th Cir. 2016); AseraCare II, 176 F. Supp. 3d 1282, 1284 (N.D. Ala. 2016).

FOMATTED - BUCK - FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

42

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/1/2018 1:14 PM

[Vol. 49:1

progeny. That is seemingly what defense counsel would have the
enforcement regime resemble, which is, in effect, an unenforceable legal rule
because of the helpless complexity and variability that accompanies medical
practice. Nevertheless, this results in an under-inclusive rule altogether
because some physicians do administer health services that are knowingly
lacking in medical necessity, and billing for those services clearly constitutes
fraud.
C. Medical Necessity as Relevant to Intent
Although most courts treat the question of whether or not care was
administered that was lacking in medical necessity as an analysis that
addresses the falsity of the claim submitted, one could make an argument
that courts should instead fit the medical necessity question into the FCA’s
intent analysis. This is for a couple of main reasons.
First, billing for care that is lacking in medical necessity is billing for a
false claim.254 Within the Medicare program, it follows that Medicare
defines what is medically necessary. It cannot be the case that care that is
the result of clinical judgment cannot be false when a claim for
reimbursement is submitted. Presumably, if Medicare’s standard is outdated
and irrational, then the provider who violates that standard and bills for the
care still has submitted a false claim for purposes of falsity under the FCA.
Indeed, when the provider bills for care that does not meet this standard, she
cannot overcome the argument that, just because reasonable doctors may
disagree over the standard, care administered and billed for is not false for
purposes of FCA liability.
Now, whether or not American patients, taxpayers, and providers want
a system that would produce such a result is a worthwhile and weighty
question—a question that has been grappled with multiple times before.255
It likely does not make sense to disempower American providers in that way,
and, in fact, doing so may chill innovation and the organic development of
the standard of care. If Medicare defines certain care as “non-medically
necessary,” however, then billing for that care—under simple interpretative
principles of the FCA—is false.
Of course, what makes this even worse for providers is that, like payers
generally, under this regime, Medicare has the discretion to change the

254

See Youtt et al., supra note 20.
See Isaac D. Buck, Caring Too Much: Misapplying the False Claims Act to Target
Overtreatment, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 463 (2013) [hereinafter Buck, Caring Too Much]
(documenting the problems associated with using the FCA to prevent and punish claims of
alleged overtreatment); Isaac D. Buck, Enforcement Overdose: Health Care Fraud
Regulation in an Era of Overcriminalization and Overtreatment, 74 MD. L. REV. 259 (2015)
(placing overtreatment regulation into the scholarship of overenforcement).
255
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standard of what is medically necessary, or not, as it sees fit. The result is a
system of outdated clinical standards, or not, depending on which area of
medicine the provider practices, and perhaps most importantly, a complex
enforcement environment that often fails to notify providers who treat
Medicare patients. What seems the most troubling about this system is
Medicare’s failure to adequately update its standards and, above all, its
failure to notify providers—either before care is administered, or even after
a bill is submitted, but well before any fraud investigation is opened—of
what, exactly, that medical standard is. The problem, then, seems to be one
of notice.
Nevertheless, a provider who submits a bill for care that is—in some
way—not what Medicare believes it should pay, has submitted a “false”
claim under the FCA. For sure, it is up to the DOJ to prove that the claim is
“false,” but concluding that “reasonable” differences in clinical decisionmaking blocks the FCA from applying to these types of clinical judgments
cannot be the rule. As the appellate brief in AseraCare mentions, “[t]he
existence of competing expert testimony as to whether a Medicare claim is
reimbursable [and if not, then false] does not mean the standard is incapable
of objective evaluation and application.”256 Adopting this new standard
would cause FCA enforcement within the health care space—and a
substantial number of enforcement actions and settlements—to grind to a
halt.
Instead, it seems as though this is not a fight over falsity at all, but rather
over the FCA’s intent standard. It is definitely the case that the FCA’s intent
standard—defined as an act requiring either “actual knowledge,”257 an act in
“deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information,”258 or an act
in “reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information”259—is often
a relatively small hurdle for prosecutors to leap. Nonetheless, there may be
clinical decisions that could meet the FCA’s falsity standard (assuming they
conflict with Medicare’s standards), but that would not constitute false
claims because the clinical decisions could be negligent or even reasonable,
given the clinical history of the patient or the typical practice of the provider.
Indeed, if the doctor has administered care that is “reasonable,” but, of
course, not in compliance with Medicare’s conception of medical necessity,
then the provider has not met the intent standard under the FCA. Even if the

256
Brief for Appellant at 28, United States v. GGNSC Admin. Servs., No. 16-13004 (11th
Cir. Aug. 31, 2016).
257
See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(i) (2018).
258
Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(ii).
259
Id. § 3729(b)(1)(A)(iii). Courts have also noted that perhaps all that is required is
gross negligence “plus.” See Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 255, at 483 n.140 (listing
cases).
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provider was in some way negligent surrounding the clinical decisionmaking vis-à-vis the Medicare standard, this would still not meet the
constraints of the FCA.260 The intent standard kicks in to protect reasonable,
and even some unreasonable, beliefs and submissions.
As the government argued in its appellant’s brief to the Eleventh
Circuit, the concepts of falsity and scienter, or intent, under the FCA were
“conflated” by the district court in AseraCare.261 After noting the court’s
conclusion that opinions and clinical judgments cannot constitute the falsity
requirement under the FCA, the DOJ argued that “whether reasonable minds
might have a good faith disagreement as to whether AseraCare’s physician
certifications were supported by medical documentation is a question that
goes to whether AseraCare knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare,
not whether those claims were false.”262 The DOJ brief goes on to argue that
[t]he district court was apparently concerned that False Claims Act
liability might attach even if a certifying physician acted
reasonably in believing that a patient was eligible for hospice
services. But that concern is not properly addressed by altering
the definition of what makes a claim “false” under the FCA. As
the Supreme Court recently explained, there is no need to “adopt[]
a circumscribed view of what it means for a claim to be false or
fraudulent,” because “concerns about fair notice and open-ended
liability ‘can be effectively addressed through strict enforcement
of the Act’s materiality and scienter requirements.’”263
Finally, the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Universal Health Services,
Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar,264 provides some additional guidance on the
question, emphasizing the importance of intent under the FCA. Even though
the Court’s analysis focused on the viability of the implied certification
theory and on materiality under the FCA, the Court did provide interesting
remarks on intent, highlighting its importance as a backstop to expansive
liability.265

260

See Buck, Caring Too Much, supra note 255, at 483.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 256, at 32.
262
Id. at 32–33.
263
Id. at 34 (citing Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, No. 15-7, slip op.
at 13–14 (S. Ct. Apr. 19, 2016)).
264
136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016).
265
See id. (“‘[I]nstead of adopting a circumscribed view of what it means for a claim to
be false or fraudulent,’ concerns about fair notice and open-ended liability ‘can be effectively
addressed through strict enforcement of the Act’s materiality and scienter requirements.’
Those requirements are rigorous.”) (internal citation omitted).
261
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* * *
Why, exactly, this relatively narrow argument over where medical
necessity belongs in the fraud enforcement context matters is because it
likely hamstrings the DOJ’s ability to adequately regulate cases of
demonstrated health care fraud. If courts conclude that doctors engaging in
“reasonable” disagreements about care are allowed to bill and receive
Medicare reimbursement for that care, then the legitimacy of the
enforcement mechanism begins to crumble.
Like in the FDCA-FDA context mentioned earlier in this Article,266 the
legal question of whether or not fraud occurred then becomes hitched to the
scientific question of whether or not the care was reasonable—or, in the
FDCA context, the question of whether the marketing information was
truthful. This builds uncertainty into the enforcement mechanism, and
allows targeted physicians and professionals to appeal to Americans’ special
reverence for the medical community while allowing for a system to take
hold that immunizes providers from suit based upon “reasonable” clinical
disagreements. As a result, the FCA fully transforms into a negligence-based
statute, immunizing providers who administer care that is not medically
necessary, but “reasonable” nonetheless.
What is particularly noteworthy about this development is that it seems
to be occurring in conjunction with strong, new value-based payment
incentives that are taking hold within Medicare. As a result, the question of
medical necessity appears to be migrating from a fraud standard to a
reimbursement one. These changes are most prominently illustrated by the
passage of the Medicare Access and CHIP Authorization Act (MACRA),267
which is summarized immediately below.
VI. MOVING TO REIMBURSEMENT-BASED INCENTIVES
As has been the case in medical necessity-based fraud enforcement,
actions like the one seen in the AseraCare case evince a deeper structural
problem within American health care. That is, within American health care,
both payers and patients are particularly vulnerable to medicine’s dark
inclinations that push the system toward excess. Laws and regulations in
health care—sources of power one would expect to protect consumers and
payers from overtreatment and excess medical costs—contain insufficient
cost-sensitive provisions. And because providers own the relevant expertise,
patients and payers are unable to evaluate and value the care they receive.
Applied in industries beyond health care, this has been defined by

266

See discussion and accompanying notes supra pp. 7–9 and notes 18–30.
See Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129
Stat. 87.
267
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economists and other scholars as the problem of “credence goods.”268 Other
scholars have referred to the challenge as the problem of the fraudulent
expert.269
In the world of fraud and abuse enforcement, the credence goods
problem makes it extraordinarily difficult for market-based consumer tools
to work. As a result, and because consumers cannot adequately protect
themselves (and their payers) from excess, the DOJ steps in to assist. And
where the DOJ intervenes using the anti-fraud tools, the medical community
often strikes back, arguing that the legal standard is outdated or unrealistic,
and application of which would actually harm patients.270
After years of an enforcement regime that has been dominated by these
arguments, it finally seemed as though Medicare had begun to turn the page
with the passage of MACRA in 2015.271 MACRA imposes a number of new
efficiency-based metrics on providers and entities, and finally moves the
overtreatment and efficiency arguments fully into reimbursement policy.
268
See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Individual Mandate as Healthcare Regulation:
What the Obama Administration Should Have Said in NFIB v. Sebelius, 39 AM. J.L. & MED.
539, 546 (2013) (noting that the credence good problem constitutes a market failure in the
health insurance marketplace, and defining a credence good as “one that consumers have a
hard time evaluating both before and after consumption such that experience provides little if
any help in determining one’s willingness to pay for future consumption—even from the same
provider”).
269
See, e.g., Nathaniel G. Hilger, Why Don’t People Trust Experts?, 59 J. L. & ECON. 293,
293 (2016) (suggesting that a conflict of interest exists because “these experts first diagnose
the consumer’s condition, and then they treat the condition they have diagnosed”). Hilger
suggests that consumers should be able to “observe experts’ cost functions,” and that without
such observation, “honest treatment becomes impossible in a wide range of price-setting and
market environments.” Id. at 294.
270
First, the provider community powerfully argues for the hospice patients who may be
adversely affected by “gun-shy” providers as a result of the government’s theory of liability.
As seen in a brief filed by the American Medical Association, among other medical
associations and societies, a powerful argument against tight application of the FCA in this
context focuses on the concerns over the impact on health care access. See Brief for the
American Medical Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, United States v.
GGNSC Admin. Servs., No. 2:12-cv-245 (11th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-13004). In attacking the
government’s argument regarding falsity, the amici argued that the government’s argument
was unreasonable, and
if accepted, the [g]overnment’s position would end up hurting the very
people the Medicare hospice benefit is supposed to help: Fearing the
prospect of litigation instigated by bounty-seeking relators, physicians
may be reluctant to certify patients as terminally ill except in the most
obvious of cases, leaving many deserving patients without the means to
pay for hospice care. Because that is the opposite of what Congress
intended, the [g]overnment’s position should be rejected, and the
judgment of the District Court affirmed.
Id. at 6.
271
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129
Stat. 87.
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Assuming the shift occurs unchanged, new policy is able to fill the gap left
by a receding medical necessity-based FCA enforcement. Instead of a hard
law solution to these thorny issues of clinical heterogeneity and fraud, CMS
seems poised to utilize reimbursement doctrine, and new value-based
metrics, to target providers. Indeed, Medicare is in the midst of a sea change
that will radically alter its ability to control costs.
MACRA constituted a fundamental shift for Medicare reimbursement
policy. For the first time in decades, Congress radically changed the way
Medicare pays its doctors under Part B272—that is, the part of the program
that pays providers, and not hospitals, for the services they provide to its
beneficiaries. Gone are the days of the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR),273
and the weak and ineffective pressure that it applied to providers in an
attempt to control their costs.274
The “milestone”275 passage of MACRA in April of 2015 repealed the
SGR structure and ushered in “sweeping changes in physician value-based
payment.”276 “Representing a historic shift from traditional Medicare feefor-service (FFS) reimbursement toward value-based payments for physician
services,”277 MACRA instantiates cost control and quality-based
reimbursement throughout Medicare. Indeed, “it affects how Medicare pays
272

See What Part B Covers, MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/what-medicarecovers/part-b/what-medicare-part-b-covers.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
273
Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 101
GEO. L.J. 519, 541 n.103 (2013) (noting that the modern SGR was established in 1997);
Wendy K. Mariner, Health Insurance Is Dead; Long Live Health Insurance, 40 AM. J.L. &
MED. 195, 205 n.82 (2014) (“Medicare’s governing legislation requires CMS to set physician
payment rates annually. The statutory formula for Sustainable Growth Rates has required
reductions in payment rates since 2002, but Congress has postponed enforcement of those
reductions annually.”).
274
Richard Dolinar & S. Luke Leininger, Pay for Performance or Compliance? A Second
Opinion on Medicare Reimbursement, 3 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 397, 401 (2006) (“The SGR
system has been ineffective in controlling volume—the volume of physician services per
beneficiary rose by almost twenty-two percent between 1999 and 2003 . . . .”); Briar Siljander
& Jennifer L. Gross, Assessing the Impact of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization
Act: The Repeal of the SGR and Beyond, 27 HEALTH LAW. 26, 26 (2015) (noting the “muchlauded repeal of the Medicare Sustainable Growth Rate [] methodology”); Bagley, supra note
273, at 542 (“Congress’s most assertive effort to counteract the incentives generated by a feefor-service payment system—the global cap on Part B payments known as the SGR—has
proven ineffective.”).
275
Quality Payment Program: Executive Summary, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS.: CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. 4 (Oct. 14, 2016),
http://www.pecaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/QPP-Executive-Summary-of-FinalRule.pdf (“The MACRA marks a milestone in efforts to improve and reform the health care
system.”).
276
D. Scott Jones, Physician Value-Based Payment Impacts All Physicians, 2016–2017,
18 J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE 11, 11 (2016).
277
Charles B. Oppenheim & Kelly A. Carroll, Looking Past MACRA’s Details: Key
Long-Term Changes Ahead for Providers, 10 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 26 (2016).
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all physicians and it will change how physicians consume and order services
of other providers in an effort to improve quality and enhance cost
effectiveness.”278
This universal reform expands value-based
reimbursement beyond the largely voluntary value-based alternative
payment methods that currently exist.279
Its most audacious action institutes the Quality Payment Program
(QPP).280 According to CMS, this could impact more than a half-million
providers, including physicians, physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and
clinical nurse specialists.281 Under the QPP, Medicare clinicians will be
separated into one of two different reimbursement tracks. First, a smaller
percentage of providers will participate in advanced alternative payment
models (advanced APMs)—these include the Medicare Shared Savings
Program and the Next Generation ACO Model.282 Some of these advanced
APMs will continue current voluntary alternative payment models.283 Those
who do not participate in an advanced APM will be enrolled in the MeritBased Incentive Physician System (MIPS). Therefore, the balance of
Medicare’s reimbursement change will take place under the MIPS program.
Still, MIPS may be subject to a number of regulatory changes and delays as
278

Id. at 29 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Shared Savings Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-ServicePayment/sharedsavingsprogram/index.html?redirect=/SharedSavingsProgram/ (last modified
Aug. 10, 2018).
280
MACRA Quality Payment Program Overview, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS.: CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Oct. 26, 2016),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/ValueBased-Programs/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs/MACRA-Quality-Payment-Program-webinarslides-10-26-16.pdf [hereinafter MACRA Quality Payment Program Overview].
281
Id. at 7 (those participating in Part B Medicare who bill the program more than $30,000
annually and those who see more than 100 Medicare patients per year will be subject to the
new reimbursement scheme). Newly-enrolled Medicare clinicians and those who participate
in alternative payment methods, as well as those who do not meet the monetary and patient
number cutoffs, are exempt from the reforms of MIPS. Id. See also Krista Teske, Your
Questions About the MACRA Final Rule—Answered, ADVISORY BOARD (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.advisory.com/research/physician-practice-roundtable/members/expertinsights/2016/nine-faqs-on-provider-payment-under-macra
(“CMS
estimates
that
approximately 712,000 clinicians will be affected by QPP changes in the first performance
year (2017). However, not all clinicians will be subject to these changes.”).
282
MACRA Quality Payment Program Overview, supra note 280, at 19; see also
Oppenheim & Carroll, supra note 277, at 33 (“APMs include models such as accountable care
organizations, patient-centered medical homes, and other models that have been evaluated by
the Center or Medicare and Medicaid Innovation.”).
283
See Alternative Payment Models in the Quality Payment Program as of February
2018, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.: CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Payment-Program/Resource-Library/
Comprehensive-List-of-APMs.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) (providing a chart for all
advanced payment models and whether they qualify as an advanced APM under the new
QPP).
279
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it is implemented.
As of late 2017, under MIPS, a provider’s reimbursement is affected by
a composite score of four different criteria: quality, advancing care
information, improvement activities, and cost.284 During the first year, the
quality data was scheduled to be weighted to make up sixty percent of the
overall MIPS score, while improvement activities would make up fifteen
percent, and advancing care information would make up the remaining
twenty-five percent.285 The cost metric is not included in the initial year of
data collection; it begins in 2018.286 By the 2019 performance year,
however, cost will be weighted to make up thirty percent of the providers’
overall MIPS score, and quality will drop from sixty to thirty percent.287
Payment adjustments under MIPS will begin on January 1, 2019, as the first
performance year has already concluded—it began on January 1, 2017.288
The four categories seek to encourage providers to administer highquality care. Advancing care information seeks to protect patient health
information, encourage electronic prescribing, provide patient electronic
access, and promote the health information exchange.289 Improvement
activities ask providers to “attest to participation in activities that improve
clinical practice,” like shared decision-making, patient safety efforts, care
coordination, and increased access.290 The quality performance category
asks providers to select six of 271 possible quality measures, which includes
one outcome measure or high-priority measure, on which to be measured.291
284
See The Quality Payment Program Overview Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS.: CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.
9–10,
https://www.nyspsych.org/assets/docs/quality_payment_program_overview_fact_sheet.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2017).
285
Id.
286
Id. at 10.
287
See Quality Payment Program Final Rule Summary, AM. SOC’Y FOR RADIATION
ONCOLOGY
4,
https://www.astro.org/uploadedFiles/_MAIN_SITE/Daily_Practice/Medicare_Payment_Initi
atives/MACRA/Content/MACRAFinalRuleSummary.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2017). In the
2018 performance year, cost constitutes ten percent of the overall MIPS score, while quality
drops from a weighted value of sixty percent to fifty percent. Id.
288
The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: Advancing Care Information and
Improvement Activities Performance Categories, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.:
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.
14
(Dec.
13,
2016),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/ValueBased-Programs/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs/MIPS-ACI-and-IA-presentation.pdf.
289
Id. at 20.
290
Id. at 27.
291
The Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: Quality and Cost Performance
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And although the cost criterion does not enter the calculus until 2018, CMS
has provided guidance for developing cost measures as well.292 Its focus is
on efficiency.293
MIPS penalties and bonuses will be phased in. In 2019, the first
payment program year, penalties and bonuses will be limited to four percent
adjustments of the provider’s overall Medicare Part B reimbursement.294 But
by 2022 and after, the top penalties and bonuses could grow to nine
percent.295 Because MACRA “locks provider payment rates at near zero
growth,”296 and requires general budget neutrality, “such that the increase in
charges resulting from positive adjustments equals the estimated decrease in
charges resulting from negative MIPS adjustments,”297 the bonuses that
providers receive for positive adjustments could be as high as three times the
penalties. Although it will not be known until the total numbers of positive
adjustments are known, this general neutrality requirement means that
bonuses could be as high as twenty-seven percent in 2022.298
Finally, given the undeniable fluidity that defines the current state of
American health law and policy, it is worthwhile to consider whether the
changes brought by MACRA and MIPS should be considered to be
permanent. At least one consultant had noted that, while Congressional
Republicans clearly intended to repeal and replace the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2017, this “sentiment does not carry over to
QPP” due to its strong support, its budgetary upside, and bipartisan interest
in securing the future financial stability of Medicare.299 Even though the
repeal and replace effort did not succeed, the ACA has nonetheless been
impacted by policy changes and enforcement priorities. Still, the Trump
administration seems poised to limit and remake the MIPS program for
2019.300
292
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VII. CONCLUSION
Like the larger health care delivery and administrative industry, the
FCA—as it applies to medical necessity-based fraud cases in the United
States—has entered a period of major uncertainty. While courts recognize
new theories of falsity under the FCA, reimbursement-based tools are
becoming more prominent. The FCA’s losses may be the reimbursement
scheme’s gains. Nonetheless, the inability to use the FCA to regulate
medical practice that is based upon a controversial conception of medical
necessity may have real consequences for the future of health care fraud and
abuse regulation—and, undoubtedly, on both the quality that American
patients receive and the prices they pay.

